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ABSTRACT 
 
Chanda Denee Marlowe: Student Privacy and School Surveillance Videos 
(Under the direction of Cathy Packer) 
 
 This thesis takes a close look at school video surveillance case law, pertaining to both 
school employees and students, to try to determine what legal rights, if any, students have to be 
free from school video surveillance on public school grounds. It concludes that, unless a state 
law offers greater privacy protection, students have a right to be free from video surveillance in 
school locker rooms or other areas on campus that schools have designated for them to change 
clothes, but nowhere else. This thesis also takes a close look at the statutes, regulations, 
guidance, and court decisions that govern the disclosure of school surveillance videos to better 
understand who can get access to those videos and under what circumstances. Given a school’s 
broad authority to record its students and staff, the issue of who gets access to the surveillance 
footage after a student has been recorded is particularly salient. Finally, this thesis concludes 
with a set of best practices for public schools that are considering adopting or increasing school 
video surveillance. 
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CHAPTER 1: SCHOOL VIDEO SURVEILLANCE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Schools are keeping close eyes on their students.1 Seventy-five percent of the nation's 
public elementary, middle, and high schools report use of one or more security cameras as part of 
their school monitoring systems, and, as one lawyer put it, public school districts across the 
nation are beginning to adopt America’s “newest darling of criminal justice reform”– body-worn 
cameras.2 Even though these surveillance measures are intended to keep schools safe, privacy 
advocates are skeptical.3 They worry that any benefits gained from these initiatives will come at 
the expense of students’ privacy.4 With cameras in schools increasing, it is important to consider 
what legal rights students have to challenge school video surveillance.  
                                                
1 LUCINDA GRAY, ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PUBLIC SCHOOL SAFETY AND DISCIPLINE: 2013–14 (2015). The 
percentage of schools using one or more security cameras has increased considerably since 2009–10 when sixty-one 
percent of schools reported the use of one or more video surveillance cameras. 
 
2 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PUBLIC SCHOOL SAFETY AND DISCIPLINE: 2013–14 
(2015), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2015/2015051.pdf; Rachel Levinson-Waldman, The Dystopian Danger of Police 
Body Cameras, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/dystopian-danger-
police-body-cameras. While there are currently no national statistics available on the use of police body cameras in 
schools, there have been news reports about the use of body cameras in schools in Houston, Texas; Memphis, 
Tennessee; Topeka, Kansas;  and Des Moines, Iowa, have adopted them recently. Evie Blad, Body Cameras on 
School Police Spark Student Privacy Concerns, EDUC. WK., Mar. 3, 2015, 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2015/03/04/body-cameras-on-school-police-spark-student.html. The school 
district in Houston, Texas, started with 25 school officers wearing body cameras as a part of a pilot program, and the 
district has plans to expand the program to all 210 members of the force. Id. The school district in Des Moines, 
Iowa, has taken this initiative one step further by equipping its principals and assistant principals with body cameras 
to wear while interacting with students and parents. Mackenzie Ryan, New Arena for Body Cameras: Iowa Schools, 
USA TODAY, July 6, 2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2015/07/06/iowa-body-cameras-
video-schools/29761487/.  
 
3 Evie Blad, Body Cameras on School Police Spark Student Privacy Concerns, EDUC. WK., Mar. 3, 2015, 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2015/03/04/body-cameras-on-school-police-spark-student.html. 
 
4 See discussion infra Chapter I, Part II. 
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According to the Association of Texas Professional Educators, the legal implications of 
school video surveillance can be divided into main categories: “the legality of making a 
recording of students and the legality of showing that recording to a specific individual.”5 The 
Supreme Court has ruled that schools cannot make recordings of students in school locker rooms 
where they change clothes, but courts have yet to address the issue of whether students can be 
recorded on other areas of a school’s campus.6 In cases outside of the school environment, courts 
have consistently held that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy when they are 
in public view.7 Therefore, it is generally assumed by school officials that students can be 
recorded in common areas in schools because common areas are considered within the public 
view.8 Proponents of body-worn cameras in schools have relied on this reasoning, along with the 
fact that cameras already line school parking lots, cafeterias, and hallways, to argue that 
outfitting school officers and administrators with body cameras is a natural progression without 
                                                
5 Cameras in the classroom: FAQs on Senate Bill 507, TEACH THE VOTE (July 15, 2015), 
http://www.teachthevote.org/news/2015/07/15/cameras-in-the-classroom-faqs-on-senate-bill-507/. 
 
6 Brannum v. Overton Cty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 497 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[V]ideo surveillance … significantly 
invaded students’ reasonable expectations of privacy in boys’ and girls’ locker rooms.”). 
 
7 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448-49 (1989); U.S. v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir.1991); U.S. 
v. Boden, 854 F.2d 983, 990 (7th Cir.1988); U.S. v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir.1991). 
 
8 See, e.g., Chadwell v. Brewer, 59 F. Supp. 3d 756, 765 (W.D. Va. 2014) (holding a teacher, who was suspected of 
drinking on the job, had no constitutional right to privacy to be free recording in his office); Plock v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Freeport Sch. Dist., 145, 545 F. Supp. 2d 755 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (holding teachers had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in communications in their classrooms, as required to challenge audio monitoring under Fourth 
Amendment); Goodwin v. Moyer, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 2006 WL 839342 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (holding a bus driver, 
who was suspected of abusing a student, had no expectation of privacy when it comes to school video surveillance 
on a public school bus); John E. Theuman, Annotation, Constitutionality of Secret Video Surveillance, 91 A.L.R.5th 
585, 596 (2001); Dominique Braggs, Webcams in Classrooms: How Far Is Too Far? 33 J.L. & EDUC. 275, 277–82 
(2004). 
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legal ramifications.9  This thesis will explore whether these assumptions about student privacy 
are settled by law.  
Given a school’s seemingly broad authority to record its students, the issue of who gets 
access to the surveillance footage after a student has been recorded is particularly salient and will 
also be explored in this thesis. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act10 (FERPA) 
generally governs the disclosure of school surveillance videos. When a school surveillance video 
is considered an education record under FERPA, it cannot be disclosed to the public without 
parental permission.11 Unfortunately, it is not always easy to determine what constitutes an 
education record under FERPA.12 Finally, even if a school surveillance video is determined to be 
an education record under FERPA, it can still be disclosed to appropriate parties under certain 
circumstances.  
Thus, the three-fold purpose of this thesis is to take a close look at the legal rights of 
students to challenge public school video surveillance, the rights of others to access surveillance 
videos once they have been recorded, and best practices for schools that are considering adopting 
or increasing school video surveillance measures. 13 Chapter One will discuss relevant scholarly 
literature, research questions, methodologies, and limitations. Chapter Two will review cases in 
which students and school employees have challenged school video surveillance under the 
                                                
9 See Rachel Levinson-Waldman, The Dystopian Danger of Police Body Cameras, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 
17, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/dystopian-danger-police-body-cameras. 
 
10 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(A). 
 
11 Id. 
 
12 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(A) (defining “education records” as “those records, files, documents, and other materials 
which contain information directly related to the student and are maintained by an educational agency or institution 
or by a person acting for such agency or institution.”) There is no comprehensive list of what is considered an 
education record under FERPA. See id.  
 
13 School employee cases are included because the courts’ discussions of what makes it reasonable to record 
employees in some areas of a school’s campus but not others can shed light on whether students are likely to receive 
similar protections in those areas. 
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Fourth Amendment, state constitutions, state tort law, and state eavesdropping statutes in order to 
better understand what students can do legally to stop schools from recording them. Chapter 
Three will review FERPA, along with the U.S. Department of Education’s FERPA regulations 
and the U.S. Department of Education’s guidance interpreting FERPA, state privacy laws, and 
court decisions that govern the disclosure of student information in order to better understand 
who can get access to public school surveillance videos and under what circumstances. Chapter 
Four, the final chapter of this thesis, will provide a summary of the finding of this research and a 
best practice guide for school districts that are considering adopting or increasing school video 
surveillance measures.  
Literature Review 
 While scholars have been writing about surveillance, in general, for centuries, scholars 
began writing about school video surveillance, in particular, in the early 2000s. Scholars have 
discussed why schools subject students to school video surveillance, what problems are caused 
when students are subjected to school video surveillance, whether students have protection 
against school video surveillance, and who can access school surveillance videos. 
Why Schools Subject Students to School Video Surveillance  
Schools subject students to school video surveillance to keep students safe. According to 
education law scholar Kevin P. Brady, “Beginning in the 1980s, the primary justification for 
installing video cameras in U.S. schools was as a deterrent to school violence, vandalism, and 
theft.”14 Brady explained that school leaders are similar to parents in that they both desire to 
                                                
14 Kevin P. Brady & Cynthia Dieterich, Video Surveillance of Special Education 
Classrooms: Necessary Protections of Vulnerable Students or Intrusive Surveillance of Select Student Populations?, 
325  EDUC. L. REP. 573, 577 (2016). 
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protect children.15 Courts have found this school responsibility for maintaining school safety 
argument compelling, even if student privacy is sacrificed. For example, in one student privacy 
case, the U.S. Supreme Court said: “A student's privacy interest is limited in a public school 
environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety. 
Securing order in the school environment sometimes requires that students be subjected to 
greater controls than those appropriate for adults.”16  
Unfortunately, there is some evidence that school video surveillance does not prevent 
violence and that it might harm students. According to the National Association of School 
Psychologists, “There is no clear evidence that the use of metal detectors, security cameras, or 
guards in schools is effective in preventing school violence.”17 As Dominique Braggs explained,  
Columbine High School had surveillance cameras in place prior to the 1999 school shooting, but 
they were largely unmonitored and did not deter the two shooters.18 Additionally, the National 
Association of School Psychologists wrote, “Surveillance cameras in schools may have the effect 
of simply moving misbehavior to places in schools or outside of schools that lack 
surveillance.”19 
                                                
15 Id. 
 
16 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. vs. Earls 536 U.S. 822, 831 (2002); see 
also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (Powell, J., concurring) (“Without first establishing 
discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students. And apart from education, 
the school has the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other children, and also to protect 
teachers themselves from violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has prompted 
national concern.”). 
 
17 NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. PSYCHOLOGISTS, RESEARCH ON SCHOOL SECURITY: THE IMPACT OF SECURITY MEASURES 
ON STUDENTS 1 (2013), http://www.audioenhancement.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/school-security-by-
NASP.pdf; see also Andrew Hope, Governmentality and the ‘Selling’ of School Surveillance Devices, 63 SOC. REV. 
4, 840–47 (2015) (“[T]he continuing high incidence of school shootings in the U.S. (eight in 2010, ten in 2011, 
fourteen in 2012, thirty-two in 2013 and over forty in 2014), suggests that increasing use of school surveillance 
devices might not provide an adequate solution.”). 
 
18 Dominique Braggs, Webcams in Classrooms: How Far Is Too Far? 33 J.L. & EDUC. 275, 281 (2004). 
 
19 NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. PSYCHOLOGISTS, supra note 17. 
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Schools may also monitor students because they want to encourage good behavior. Bryan 
Warnick, an Ohio State University professor, noted in his research on school video surveillance 
that “some teachers use webcams to allow parents to track the activities of their children in the 
classroom.”20 In those instances, the teachers hoped that parental involvement would have a 
direct impact on the students’ actions in their classrooms.21 According to privacy expert Daniel 
Solove, “This aspect of surveillance does not automatically make it harmful . . .  since social 
control can be beneficial and every society must exercise a sizeable degree of social control.”22  
Psychological studies provide interesting examples of why this is true. For example, in one study 
conducted by Arther L. Bearman et al., children selected fewer pieces of candy when there was a 
mirror behind the unguarded candy bowl.23 In another study, psychologists Max Ernest-Jones et 
al. found that people were twice as likely to clean up after themselves in a cafeteria when there 
was a poster of human eyes on the cafeteria wall.24 These findings show that school video 
surveillance may produce socially desirable results that are both beneficial to the individual 
student and the school community at large.   
What Problems Are Caused When Students Are Subjected to School Video Surveillance 
 
Scholars have written about the problems caused by surveillance, some of which are 
especially applicable to students. For one, the knowledge or perception of surveillance can have 
a chilling effect, curtailing student expression, creativity, and growth. According to Solove: “Not 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
20 Bryan Warnick, Surveillance Cameras in Schools: An ethical analysis, 77 HARV. EDUC. REV. 317, 319 (2007). 
 
21 Id. 
 
22 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 UNIV. OF PENN. L. REV. 477, 493 (2006). 
 
23 Arthur L. Beaman et al., Self-Awareness and Transgression in Children: Two Field Studies, 10 J. OF 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1835–46 (1979).  
 
24 Max Ernest-Jones et al., Effects of Eye Images on Everyday Cooperative Behavior: A Field Experiment, 32 
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 172–78 (2011). 
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only can direct awareness of surveillance make a person feel extremely uncomfortable, but it can 
also cause that person to alter her behavior. Surveillance can lead to self-censorship and 
inhibition.”25 Law professor Julie Cohen further explained: “[P]ervasive monitoring of every first 
move or false start will, at the margin, incline choices toward the bland and the mainstream. 
Monitoring constrains the acceptable spectrum of belief and behavior [resulting in] a subtle yet 
fundamental shift in the content of our character, a blunting and blurring of rough edges and 
sharp lines.”26 According to Bryan Warnick, a professor at Ohio State University, school video 
surveillance has the potential to make every moment static.27 Warnick argued, “Places of human 
growth and development [like schools] need to be places that possess a certain type of 
forgiveness . . . [and] the presence of video cameras and recordings sends a message of neither 
forgiveness nor forgetfulness.”28 As legal scholar John Theuman pointed out, “Video 
surveillance . . . may be considered far more invasive than conventional investigative techniques 
– for the camera sees all, and forgets nothing.”29 This has made law scholars and parents worry 
that past judgments or unflattering evaluations will follow students for unreasonable amounts of 
time and stifle their potential.30   
                                                
25 Solove, supra note 22, at 493. 
 
26 See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 
1397–98 (2000). 
 
27 Warnick, supra note 20, at 333–34. 
 
28 Id. 
 
29 John E. Theuman, Annotation, Constitutionality of Secret Video Surveillance, 91 A.L.R. 5th 585, 596 (2001). 
 
30 See, e.g., Jason P. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, 63 EMORY L.J. 1 (2013); Beyond One Classroom: 
Parental Support For Technology and Data Use in Schools, FPF SURV. (Future of Privacy Forum, Washington, 
D.C.), Dec. 8, 2016, at 5, available at https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Beyond-One-Classroom.pdf. 
Sixty-eight percent of parents are concerned that an electronic record would be used in the future against their child 
by a college or an employer. Id. Social media scholar danah boyd does not capitalize her name. See danah m. boyd, 
What’s in a Name?, DANAH, https://www.danah.org/name.html.  
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Surveillance can also affect students’ perceptions of the world and their self-images. 
Social media scholar and youth advocate danah boyd acknowledged that school surveillance can 
provide a sense of security for students, but also explained that it “can evoke anger, 
embarrassment, guilt, shame, [and] fear.”31 The National Association of School Psychologists 
said, “Analysis of the use of surveillance cameras in schools suggests that they may work to 
corrode the educational environment by, among other things, implicitly labeling students as 
untrustworthy.”32 According to Kirstie Ball et al., there is a risk that children who are subjected 
to extensive monitoring will begin to view themselves as criminal or delinquent because 
surveillance in many contexts is focused on monitoring suspicious groups to prevent criminal 
activity.33  
Do Students Have Protection Against Public School Video Surveillance? 
The consensus among scholars is that public schools do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment when they implement school video surveillance because school employees and 
students have no reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas in schools.34 In 2003, for 
example, criminal justice scholar Crystal A. Garcia and law professor Sheila Suess Kennedy 
wrote that “[i]t is highly unlikely that courts will find constitutional impediments to deployment 
of most technologies currently in the schools,” but the constitutional problems that  “currently 
exist are more likely to involve discriminatory use or an impermissible location of the 
                                                
31 danah boyd, Making Sense of Privacy and Publicity, SXSW (Austin, TX, Mar.13, 2010), 
http://www.danah.org/papers/talks/2010/ SXSW2010.html. Boyd does not capitalize her name. 
 
32 NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. PSYCHOLOGISTS, supra note 17. 
 
33 KIRSTIE BALL ET AL., The Problem of Surveillance and Gender, ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE 
STUDIES 51 (Routledge 2012). 
 
34 See, e.g., Clifford S. Fishman & Anne T. McKenna, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING § 30:24 (“A number of 
courts have properly held that teachers and students have no right not to be videotaped in classrooms and other 
public areas of a public school.”); John E. Theuman, Annotation, Constitutionality of Secret Video Surveillance, 91 
A.L.R. 5th 585, 596 (2001). 
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technology.”35 Garcia and Kenney pointed out that a camera in a hallway would be inoffensive 
because it would see no more than what an alert teacher would see whereas a camera in a 
restroom might constitute an invasion of student privacy. In 2004, Braggs discussed the 
constitutional issues surrounding webcams in classrooms, using Biloxi, Mississippi’s school 
district, the first in the nation to place webcams in all of its classrooms, as a case study.36 Braggs 
defined webcams as “small cameras that take pictures at regular intervals and upload the 
information to a website.”37 The cameras in Braggs’s study recorded images, not sound.38 
According to Braggs, Biloxi’s installation of webcams in all classrooms did not violate the 
constitution because “classrooms are public spaces where students have no expectation of 
privacy.”39 
 In 2004, education law scholars Nathan Roberts and Richard Fossey reviewed two cases 
in which state courts ruled on the constitutionality of video surveillance of school employees on 
school grounds.40 Roberts and Fossey wrote that the courts relied on the U.S. Supreme Court 
case O'Connor v. Ortega,41 which established “the constitutionality of a public workplace search 
                                                
35 Crystal A. Garcia & Sheila Suess Kennedy, Back to School: Technology, School Safety and the Disappearing 
Fourth Amendment, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 275, 280 (2003).  
 
36 Braggs, supra note 18, at 277–82 (2004). 
 
37 Id. at 277. 
 
38 Id. 
 
39 Id. at 278. Braggs based her conclusion on the line of Supreme Court decisions that established that individuals 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in public places and the U.S. Supreme Court case New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
which held that “students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the 
population generally.” 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1995). 
 
40 Nathan Roberts & Richard Fossey, Searches and Seizures in the School Workplace: Where Does the Teacher 
Stand?, 192 ED. LAW REP. 4 (2004).  
 
41 480 U.S. 709, 107 (1987). 
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would be judged based on its reasonableness, not on the more onerous ‘probable cause’42 
standard that applies to the police.”43 According to Roberts and Fossey, the courts concluded the 
schools’ video surveillance measures were reasonable because the places in question – a 
classroom and an employee break room – were open and visible to others on campus.44  
In 2007, education law scholar Kevin P. Brady discussed “the appropriate laws and 
inherent limitations associated with the installation of a legally compliant video camera 
surveillance system in the public school environment.”45 Brady reviewed three lower court cases 
in which the courts ruled school employees had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a 
classroom, a shared office space, or an employee break room.46 Brady concluded, “Generally, the 
use of video surveillance without audio capability in schools does not violate any constitutional 
principles.”47 In 2013, Jason P. Nance, an assistant professor at the University of Florida Levin 
College of Law, wrote that school video surveillance for security purposes is constitutional under 
the Fourth Amendment.48 Nance said, “[I]f the issue were presented to courts, courts most likely 
                                                
42 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (Probable cause “exist[s] where the known facts and 
circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found.”) 
 
43Roberts & Fossey, supra note 40, at 4. In State v. McLellan, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire relied on 
O'Connor v. Ortega when considering a criminal case against a school custodian who had been charged with 
misdemeanor theft for allegedly taking money from a teacher's desk. 744 A. 2d 611 (N.H. 1999). In Brannen v. 
Kings Local School District, the Ohio Court of Appeals relied on O'Connor when considering a case in which 
school custodians claimed a hidden video camera, which their supervisor had placed in their break room, violated 
their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful searches. 761 N.E.2d 84 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).  
 
44 Id. 
 
45 Kevin P. Brady, "Big Brother" Is Watching, but Can He Hear, Too?: Legal Issues Surrounding Video Camera 
Surveillance and Electronic Eavesdropping in Public Schools, 218 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2007). 
 
46 Roberts v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 788 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Crist v. Alpine Union Sch. Dist., 
2005 WL 2362729 (Cal. App. 4 Dist.); Brannen v. Kings Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 761 N.E.2d 84 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2001). 
 
47 Kevin P. Brady, supra note 45, at 5. 
 
48 Jason P. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, 63 EMORY L.J. 1 (2013). 
 11 
would justify the use of surveillance cameras in public spaces at schools on the theory that 
recording individuals in public places is minimally intrusive.”49 However, Nance argued that 
recording individuals in public places is intrusive.50 According to Nance, when schools use a 
combination of security measures, the measures are no longer minimally intrusive: “the 
cumulative effect . . . amounts to a substantial invasion of students’ privacy, harming students’ 
educational progress.”51 Nance called for students' Fourth Amendment rights to be 
strengthened.52  
Scholars are in agreement that school employees and students have reasonable 
expectations of privacy in school locker rooms. In 2007, Brady reviewed one case decided by the 
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Brannum v. Overton 
County School Board,53 in which the court ruled against the school district for videotaping 
students undressing in a locker room.54 Based on Brannum, Brady advised public school officials 
to use caution when choosing the locations of their video cameras.55 In 2008, Brannum went to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,56 and Judith O’Gallagher was one of the first 
lawyers to provide a detailed summary of that court’s analysis and ruling.57 O’Gallagher 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
49 Id. at 13. 
 
50 Id. at 8. 
 
51 Id. 
 
52 Id. at 57. 
 
53 516 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2008).  
 
54 Kevin P. Brady, supra note 45, at 5. 
 
55 Id.  
 
56 516 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 
57 Judith O’Gallagher, Surveillance Camera in School Locker Room Violates Fourth Amendment, 26 MCQUILLIN 
MUN. L. REP. 1. (2008).  
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explained that the Sixth Circuit relied on the constitutional prerequisites of valid school searches, 
which were established in New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985)58 and Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton 
(1995),59 to reach its conclusion that videotaping students while they changed clothes was an 
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.60 In T.L.O., the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
an assistant principal’s search of a high school student’s purse did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.61 The T.L.O. Court said a search is reasonable when it is justified at its inception 
and when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting the search will turn up evidence that a 
student has violated school rules or the law.62 O’Gallagher explained how the Brannum court 
relied on the T.L.O. framework to determine that the school’s decision to use video surveillance 
for security purposes was justified at its inception but not reasonable in scope and manner.63  
According to O’Gallagher, the Brannum court found recording students in a school locker room 
where students changed clothes to be too intrusive, especially when there was no history of 
threats to security in that location.64 O’Gallagher also discussed how the Brannum court 
distinguished its facts from Vernonia.65 In Vernonia, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a school’s 
decision to subject student-athletes to random drug tests did not violate the Fourth Amendment.66 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
58 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 
59 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
 
60 O’Gallagher, supra note 57. 
 
61 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 
62 Id. at 326. 
 
63 Id. 
 
64 Id. 
 
65 Id. 
 
66 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
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As O’Gallagher explained, the parents in Vernonia “were well aware that participation in school 
sports was conditioned on the students submitting to drug-testing policies,” whereas the parents 
in Brannum were not put on notice that their children were subjected to video surveillance in 
school locker rooms.67 
Scholars and others have written about state laws that limit a school’s ability to record its 
students. In 2012, law student Beth Martinez wrote about a Georgia statute that provides greater 
protection against the silent video recording of students than federal law provides.68 The Georgia 
statute forbids “[a]ny person, through the use of any device, without the consent of all persons 
observed, to observe, photograph, or record the activities of another which occur in any private 
place and out of public view.”69 Martinez explained that the Georgia statute defines a private 
place as a space “where one is entitled reasonably to expect to be safe from casual or hostile . . . 
surveillance.”70 According to Martinez, this broad definition has proven problematic because it 
lends itself to various interpretations.71 Martinez discussed a Georgia court’s observation in 
Atlanta Independent School System v. S.F. ex rel. M.F.72 that “according to Georgia courts, an 
evaluation of a defendant's expectation of privacy should depend on ‘the same principles as 
privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment,’” not the Georgia surveillance statute.73 In 
                                                
67 O’Gallagher, supra note 57. 
 
68 Beth Martinez, Location, Location, Location: A "Private" Place and Other Ailments of Georgia Surveillance Law 
Curable Through Alignment with the Federal System, 46 GA. L. REV. 1089 (2012). 
 
69 Id. at 1090 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62(2)). 
 
70 Id. at 1092. 
 
71 Id. at 1108. 
 
72 No. 1:09-CV-2166-RWS, 2010 WL 4837613 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 23, 2010). 
 
73 Beth Martinez, supra note 68, at 1108–09 (quoting Atlanta Independent School System v. S.F. ex rel. M.F., No. 
1:09-CV-2166-RWS, 2010 WL 4837613 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 23, 2010). 
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2016, education lawyers Stuart S. Waxman and Frank G. Barile analyzed two New York Public 
Employment Relations Board decisions74 involving instances where school video surveillance 
conflicted with New York’s Taylor Law.75 The Taylor Law gives employees the right to 
negotiate the terms and condition of their employment.76 Waxman and Barile explained that a 
school district’s decision to use video surveillance might compromise employee job security or 
implicate employee privacy concerns, which could impact working conditions in violation of the 
Taylor Law.77 
Who Can Access School Surveillance Videos?  
Scholars have discussed the disclosure of school surveillance video to parents, police, and 
media. Most of those scholars, in a paragraph or two, point out the ambiguity surrounding 
schools’ decisions to disclose or not to disclose school surveillance videos, but do not discuss 
this issue at length.    
In 2007, education law scholar Kevin P. Brady wrote that parents are usually legally 
entitled to access videotapes of their children taken in a school setting under the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act78 (FERPA).79 Also in 2007, W. D. Wright and Pamela Darr 
                                                
74 See Civil Serv. Emps. Ass'n, Local 1000, 45 N.Y. P.E.R.B. P 3007 (2011); Custodian Ass'n of Elmont, 28 N.Y. 
P.E.R.B. P 4693 (1995). 
 
75 Stuart S. Waxman & Frank G. Barile, "Eye in the Sky": Employee Surveillance in the Public Sector, 79 ALB. L. 
REV. 131 (2016); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney 2015) (Under the Taylor Law, “it is an improper 
practice for a public employer or its agents deliberately to interfere with, restrain or coerce public employees in the 
exercise of their rights guaranteed in section two hundred two of this article for the purpose of depriving them of 
such rights.”) 
 
76 N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney 2015). 
 
77 Stuart S. Waxman & Frank G. Barile, "Eye in the Sky": Employee Surveillance in the Public Sector, 79 ALB. L. 
REV. 131 (2016); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney 2015). 
 
78 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (FERPA was passed in 1974 “to protect the privacy of student educational records by 
regulating to whom and under what circumstances those records may be disclosed.”) 
 
79Kevin P. Brady, supra note 45. 
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Wright, authors of Special Education Law, explained that schools do not always give parents 
access, even when parents are entitled to it.80 According to Wright and Wright, “School officials 
use ‘privacy arguments’ to prevent parents from observing their child or having access to the 
child's records . . .  because they want to show the parent who's boss.”81 Wright and Wright said 
this happens when a school believes it has made a mistake or when a parent questions a school’s 
authority.82  
Scholars have also discussed media access to school surveillance videos. For example, 
the Student Press Law Center has argued that FERPA has limited media access to student 
information more than legislators intended.83 According to the Student Press Law Center, 
schools “persistently cite FERPA to deny journalists’ requests for public records[, including 
school surveillance footage,] even when the records have little relation to a student’s educational 
life.”84 The SPLC also said, “[M]any of the documents that schools and colleges mistakenly 
believe to be FERPA records  . . . cannot qualify as ‘education records’ under the [Department of 
Education’s] definition.”85 Law student Sarah P. West wrote, “Courts have not definitively 
established surveillance video as an education record, and the U.S. Department of Education has 
provided sparse guidance on the subject.”86 West also pointed out the “tension between FERPA, 
                                                
80 PETER W.D. WRIGHT & PAMELA D. WRIGHT, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW (Harbor House Law Press) (2007), 
http://www.wrightslaw.com/advoc/ltrs/video_privacy.htm. 
 
81 Id. 
 
82 Id. 
 
83 FERPA and Access to Public Records, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. 1 (2016), 
http://du1hnuqovpr1r.cloudfront.net/2016041371l3MOalqW/dist/img/ferpa_wp.pdf.  
 
84 Id.  
 
85 Id. at 3. 
 
86 Sarah P. West, They Got Eyes in the Sky: How the Family Educational rights and Privacy Act Governs Body 
Camera Use in Public Schools, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1533, 1536 (2016). 
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[which] require[es] student privacy and control over education records, and state open records 
laws, [which] require[e] disclosure of certain records.” She explained that access to school 
surveillance video could vary state to state.87  
Very few scholars have written about police access to school video surveillance. For 
example, in 2016, West explained that there was some ambiguity regarding whether body 
camera footage would be considered an education record or a law enforcement record under 
FERPA. According to West, education records are those records that are collected and 
maintained by school officials while law enforcement records are those records collected by law 
enforcement units for specific law enforcement purposes.88 West further explained, “[L]aw 
enforcement records, as opposed to education records, may be disclosed to third parties, 
including agents of the juvenile justice system, without the student's consent.”89 West concluded, 
“The plain text of FERPA [] reinforces the concept that body camera footage is an education 
record, not a law enforcement record” because the footage would be use primarily in disciplinary 
proceedings by principals.90 
Scholars have been writing about students’ privacy rights and school video surveillance 
for nearly twenty years. The consensus among scholars is that schools can video students at 
school without violating students’ Fourth Amendment rights except for in areas like locker 
rooms where students change clothes. On the other hand, scholars’ discussions of whether 
schools can record and who can access those recordings are often a small part of larger articles 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
87 Id. at 1552. 
 
88 Id. at 1544. 
 
89 Id. 
 
90 Id. at 1557. 
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about school surveillance practices more generally.91 There has been no thorough analysis of this 
topic. Each scholar analyzed only a few cases. One must consult several different articles to 
begin to see the full landscape of legal issues surrounding the video surveillance of students. This 
thesis will analyze all federal and state school video surveillance cases that discuss whether 
students have a right to be free from school video surveillance in public schools. This thesis will 
also explore who can access public school video surveillance footage, using FERPA and all 
cases in which a party has claimed a right to access school surveillance videos.  
Research Questions and Methodology 
This thesis will address the following research questions: 
• What legal rights, if any, do students have to be free from public school video 
surveillance? How do courts decide? 
 
• What do FERPA, state laws, and courts say about who can access public school 
surveillance footage and under what circumstances? 
 
• What best practices should public schools follow when they are considering 
adopting or increasing school video surveillance measures?  
 
The first research question will be answered by analyzing one case involving the rights of 
students to be free from video surveillance and nine cases involving video surveillance of school 
employees. These are both state and federal cases. School employee cases are included because 
the courts’ discussions of what makes it reasonable to record employees in some areas of a 
school’s campus but not others can shed light on whether students are likely to receive similar 
protections in those areas. The second research question will be addressed using the statutes, 
regulations, guidance, and court decisions that govern the disclosure of school surveillance 
video. The final question will be addressed using the body of information compiled in this thesis.  
                                                
91 This is includes metal detectors; Global Positioning System (GPS) monitoring; radio-frequency identification 
(RFID), which uses electromagnetic fields to automatically identify and track tags attached to object; and biometric 
monitoring.  
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Limitations 
 This thesis has three major limitations. First, this thesis focuses only on student privacy 
law as it pertains to public schools, not private schools. Private schools are not subject to the 
Fourth Amendment, state constitutions, and state statutes, and private schools that do not receive 
federal funds are not subject to FERPA. Second, there is, as of now, no case law discussing 
whether students have a right to be free from video surveillance in areas on school grounds other 
than school locker rooms.92 For this reason, any legal analysis of students’ rights to be free from 
surveillance in other areas on a school’s campus must draw from cases where school employees 
have challenged school video surveillance.  
  
                                                
92 This excludes special education case law and collective bargaining case law.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE LEGALITY OF MAKING SCHOOL SURVEILLANCE VIDEOS 
 
 
Introduction 
In 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that students have a Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from school video surveillance in school locker rooms where they 
change clothes.1 The court found video surveillance of the locker rooms to be an unreasonable 
search under the Fourth Amendment.2 Courts have yet to rule on whether students have a 
constitutional right to be free from video surveillance in other areas on school grounds. However, 
cases in which school employees have challenged school video surveillance under the Fourth 
Amendment suggest students are unlikely to be protected from school video surveillance in other 
areas on a school’s campus.3 When thinking about what these cases may mean for students, it is 
important to remember that the Supreme Court has said, “[S]tudents within the school 
environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population generally.”4  
School employees have also challenged school video surveillance under state 
constitutions, state tort law, and state eavesdropping statutes. All these challenges but two were 
                                                
1 Brannum v. Overton Cty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 499 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 
2 Id. 
 
3 See, e.g., Chadwell v. Brewer, 59 F. Supp. 3d 756, 765 (W.D. Va. 2014) (holding a teacher who was suspected of 
drinking on the job had no constitutional right to privacy to be free recording in his office); Plock v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Freeport Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 755, 758 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (holding teachers had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in communications in their classrooms, as required to challenge audio monitoring under Fourth 
Amendment); Goodwin v. Moyer, 549 F. Supp. 2d 621, 634 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (holding a bus driver who was 
suspected of abusing a student had no expectation of privacy when it comes to school video surveillance on a public 
school bus). 
 
4 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995). 
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unsuccessful. Ten states expressly recognize a right to privacy in their constitutions,5 and school 
employees from two of those states have argued unsuccessfully that school video surveillance 
violated their right to privacy under their state constitutions.6 There are two cases in which 
school employees argued they had a right to be free from video surveillance under the common 
law tort of intrusion upon seclusion, and in one of these cases the school employee was 
successful.7 Finally, all states except Vermont have laws regulating eavesdropping,8 but, for the 
most part, school employees have not been successful in using state eavesdropping laws to 
challenge video surveillance that takes place on school grounds.9 However, state eavesdropping 
laws vary from state to state,10 and, in one case, the teachers who challenged a school district’s 
plan to audio record their classroom were successful because their state’s eavesdropping law 
required two-party consent.11  
                                                
5 Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 3, 2015), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-protections-in-state-
constitutions.aspx (“Constitutions in 10 states—Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Montana, South Carolina and Washington—have explicit provisions relating to a right to privacy.”). 
 
6 Crist v. Alpine Union Sch. Dist., D044775, 2005 WL 2362729, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2005); State v. 
McLellan, 744 A.2d 611 (N.H. 1999). 
 
7 John Doe (1-3) v. Dearborn Pub. Schs. No. 06-CV-12369-DT, 2008 WL 896066, *12 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2008) 
(holding gym teachers have stated a prima facie case on their intrusion upon seclusion claim based on the school 
recording them in their office, which was located in the school’s locker room where they changed clothes); Crist v. 
Alpine Union Sch. Dist., D044775, 2005 WL 2362729, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2005) (holding teachers 
failed to as a matter of law to show that the school’s surveillance of their high school office was highly offensive to 
a reasonable person). 
 
8 Tape Recording Laws at a Glance, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Aug. 1, 2012), 
https://www.rcfp.org/reporters-recording-guide/tape-recording-laws-glance. 
 
9 Evens v. Super. Ct., 91 Cal. Rptr.2d 497, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); People v. Drennan, 101 Cal. Rptr.2d 584, 590 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Duchow, 749 N.W.2d 913, 925 (Wis. 2008). 
 
10 State Law: Recording, DIGITAL MEDIA L. PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/state-law-recording (last 
visited April 20, 2017).  
 
11 Plock v. Bd. of Educ. of Freeport Sch. Dist. No. 145, 920 N.E.2d 1087 (2009).  
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Finally, students and school employees have a right to challenge school video 
surveillance under a school policy if the policy prohibits surveillance.12 One teacher sued her 
school district for violating its own policy that prohibited involuntary videotaping but lost her 
case because the policy was obsolete.13 The court would not allow the teacher to hold the school 
district to its old policy.14  
In every Fourth Amendment case, and in many of the others as well, courts discussed 
whether the school employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place she was 
recorded. For there to be a search under the Fourth Amendment, there must be a government 
intrusion in an area where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.15 Courts determine 
this on a case-by-case basis.16 The less private an area is, the less likely it is that a reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists. Courts have ruled that school employees have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in school classrooms or school break rooms.17 Courts have found that 
school employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in school offices and a diminished 
expectation of privacy on school buses.18  
Part I of this chapter will review cases in which students and school employees have 
challenged school video surveillance under the Fourth Amendment. Part II of this chapter will 
review cases in which school employees have challenged school video surveillance under their 
                                                
12 See Roberts v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 788 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. App. 1990), writ denied (June 27, 1990). 
 
13 Id. 
 
14 Id. 
 
15 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).  
 
16 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 710 (1987). 
 
17 See, e.g., Plock v. Bd. of Educ. of Freeport Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 755, 758 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Brannen v. 
Kings Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 761 N.E.2d 84, 92 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). 
 
18 John Doe (1-3) v. Dearborn Pub. Sch., No. 06-CV-12369-DT, 2008 WL 896066 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2008); 
Goodwin v. Moyer, 549 F. Supp. 2d 621 (M.D. Pa. 2006).  
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state constitutions. Part III of this chapter will review cases in which school employees have 
challenged school video surveillance under tort law. Part IV of this chapter will review cases in 
which school employees have challenged school video surveillance under state eavesdropping 
laws. Part V of this chapter will provide an example of a teacher who sued a school for violating 
its own policy.  
Right to Privacy under the Fourth Amendment 
 
When trying to determine whether school video surveillance violates students’ and school 
employees’ Fourth Amendment rights, courts first ask whether there was a search.19 If a search 
occurred, courts then ask whether that search was reasonable.20   
Did a Fourth Amendment Search Occur?  
There are eight court cases that discussed the threshold question of whether a Fourth 
Amendment search occurred when a school district recorded its students or employees.21 These 
cases relied on the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Katz v. United States,22 which formulated 
the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test that is used to decide when a governmental intrusion 
constitutes a "search" under the Fourth Amendment.23 If the government has intruded into an 
area where a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy, then no search has occurred, and 
the analysis stops there.24 The person does not have a constitutional right to challenge the video 
surveillance. According to the Supreme Court, a “reasonable expectation of privacy” exists 
                                                
19 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
 
20 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 326 (1985). 
 
21 One case in which students challenged school video surveillance and seven cases in which school employees 
challenged school video surveillance. 
 
22 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 
23 Id. at 361. 
 
24 Id. 
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when: (1) “the individual [has] manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the 
challenged search” and (2) “society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”25 
The first prong of this test is subjective, 26 which makes it difficult to contest because a defendant 
will invariably affirm that expectation.27 Therefore, courts generally focus on the second prong.28 
The second prong of the reasonable expectation of privacy test is objective.29 According to one 
federal court, the objective prong generally addresses two considerations: 
[The first consideration focuses on] what a person had an expectation of privacy 
in, for example, a home, office, phone booth or airplane. This inquiry centers on 
whether the human relationships that normally exist at the place inspected are 
based on intimacy, confidentiality, trust or solitude and hence give rise to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. The second consideration examines what the 
person wanted to protect his privacy from, for example, non-family members, 
non-employees of a firm, strangers passing by on the street or flying overhead in 
airplanes. This inquiry, therefore, focuses on the government intrusion at issue.30 
 
All courts did not go into detail about both considerations. Government employee cases often 
hinge on whether the government intrusion occurred in an area over which the employee had 
exclusive use.31 In both school employee and student cases, “the extent to which the Fourth 
Amendment protects people may depend upon where those people are.”32 The next section of 
                                                
25 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). 
 
26 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).  
 
27 Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (“A 
majority of courts that apply Katz do not even mention the subjective inquiry; when it is mentioned, it is usually not 
applied; and when it is applied, it makes no difference to outcomes.”) 
 
28 Id. 
 
29 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). 
 
30 John Doe (1-3) v. Dearborn Public School, No. 06-CV-12369-DT, 2008 WL 896066, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 
2008). 
 
31 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 710 (1987); John Doe (1-3) v. Dearborn Public School, No. 06-CV-
12369-DT, 2008 WL 896066, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2008). 
 
32 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 469, 473 (1998). 
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this chapter details what courts have said about whether students and school employees have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a number of different school locations.  
Locker rooms  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that students have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in school locker rooms where they change clothes. In Brannum v. Overton 
County School Board,33 school officials installed video cameras throughout a public middle 
school building, including the boys’ and girls’ locker rooms, in order to improve security.34 The 
video footage was transmitted to an assistant principal’s office where it was displayed and 
stored.35 The Sixth Circuit noted that the school district did not put video surveillance guidelines 
in place, “written or otherwise, determining the number, location, or operation of the surveillance 
cameras.”36 Members of a visiting school’s basketball team noticed the cameras during a girls’ 
basketball game.37 When the visiting team’s coach notified the director of schools, the director’s 
response was that the videotapes of the ten to fourteen-year-old girls contained “nothing more 
than images of a few bras and panties.”38 Thirty-four middle school students sued the school 
district despite the fact that the cameras were taken down a day after they were noticed.39 While 
                                                
33 516 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2008).  
 
34 Id. at 491–92. 
 
35 Id. at 492. (“In addition to [the assistant principal] receiving the images on his computer, they were also accessible 
via remote internet connection. Any person with access to the software username, password, and Internet Protocol 
(IP) address could access the stored images. Neither [the assistant principal] nor anyone else had ever changed the 
system password or username from its default setting. The record indicates that the system was accessed ninety-
eight different times between July 12, 2002, and January 10, 2003, including through internet service providers 
located in Rock Hill, South Carolina; Clarksville, Tennessee; and Gainsboro, Tennessee.”) 
 
36 Id. 
 
37 Id. 
 
38 Id. at 493. 
 
39 Brannum v. Overton Cty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 491–93 (6th Cir. 2008).   
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the court “acknowledged that generally, students have a less robust expectation of privacy than is 
afforded the general population,” it concluded that the “video surveillance … significantly 
invaded students’ reasonable expectations of privacy in boys’ and girls’ locker rooms.”40 The 
Sixth Circuit explained that even though the Supreme Court has previously observed locker 
rooms as places that are “not notable for the privacy they afford . . . [t]his does not mean 
however, that a student’s expectation of privacy in his or her locker room is nonexistent.”41 
Instead, the Sixth Circuit recognized, “[T]he universal understanding among middle school age 
children in this country is that a school locker room is a place of heightened privacy.”42 
According to the Sixth Circuit: “[S]tudents retain a significant privacy interest in their unclothed 
bodies . . . . [S]tudents using locker rooms could reasonably expect that no one, especially the 
school administrators, would videotape them, without their knowledge, in various states of 
undress while they changed their clothes for an athletic activity.”43 
School Offices 
 
Two federal courts have held school employees have at least some expectation of privacy 
in their offices. In John Doe (1-3) v. Dearborn Public School,44 the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Michigan said it was reasonable for gym teachers to expect to be free from 
school video surveillance in an office located inside the boys’ locker room.45 In this case, the 
principal of Dearborn High School installed cameras in the gym teachers’ office because he 
                                                
40 Id.at 496. 
 
41 Id.  
 
42 Id. at 498. 
 
43 Id. at 496. 
 
44 No. 06-CV-12369-DT, 2008 WL 896066 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2008). 
 
45 Id. at *5. 
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suspected one of the gym teachers of theft.46 The cameras were installed without the gym 
teachers’ knowledge, and the images from the concealed camera were displayed on a monitor 
located in the main office copy room.47 After finding out about the cameras, the gym teachers 
claimed they had “a reasonable expectation of privacy in their office.”48 The Dearborn court 
agreed.49 The court found the gym teachers had established their subjective expectations of 
privacy by stating their claim.50 The court found their expectations of privacy were reasonable 
because the school provided an office for the gym teachers to change from “street clothes to 
athletic clothes and to disrobe in order to shower after conducting physical education classes;” 
“the locker room/office [could] only be accessed from the boys’ locker room and [was] 
contained in the boys’ locker room;” and the office was for the exclusive use of the male 
physical education teachers who used the office at least three times a week for its intended 
purpose – changing clothes.51 Because of this, the court determined the gym teachers had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their office that society would recognize.  
In Chadwell v. Brewer,52 the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia held 
that surreptitiously videotaping the office of a teacher who was suspected of misconduct did not 
                                                
46 Id. at *1. 
 
47 Id. (“The monitor was located in the main office copy room and could display images from the concealed camera 
and the other various cameras around the building. . . . [The security director] testified that the system does record 
live images on the disc but that the storage capacity was 30 days. This meant that on the 31st day, the 1st day was 
recorded over and that the “looping” is automatic. The images from the DVR could be recorded or burned onto a 
CD.”) 
 
48 Id. at *4.  
 
49 Id. at *5. The court cited the two-part Katz test.  
 
50 John Doe (1-3) v. Dearborn Public Sch., No. 06-CV-12369-DT, 2008 WL 896066 *4 (“Addressing the first prong 
of the Katz test, Plaintiffs have established subjective expectations of privacy in the object of the challenged search. 
Plaintiffs claim they are entitled to privacy in their office and/or locker room.”) 
 
51 Id. at *5.  
 
52 59 F. Supp. 3d 756 (W.D. Va. 2014). 
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violate the teacher’s reasonable expectation of privacy.53 In this case, a principal hid a camera in 
the teacher’s office because the principal suspected the teacher was drinking during school 
hours.54 Each day, the principal reviewed the video footage, and, on one occasion, the video 
footage showed the teacher drinking beer at his desk.55 The teacher was disciplined and then later 
terminated because he violated the terms of his discipline agreement.56 The teacher sued the 
school district, alleging that the video surveillance of his office violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights.57 He argued that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office because it was 
“located at the end of a dead-end hallway and was rarely visited by anyone other than the 
teacher's aide who stored her belongings there.”58 The school district, on the other hand, argued 
he had no reasonable expectation of privacy because he shared the office with another individual 
and because “the public school setting [constitutes] an enclave of lowered expectations of 
privacy because public school administrators have the heightened burden of providing a safe 
haven for students.”59 While the court acknowledged the teacher’s “privacy expectations were 
likely tempered by the shared nature of the space and the realities of the school environment 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
53 Id. at 763. 
 
54 Id. at 759. 
 
55 Id. 
 
56 Id. After reviewing the footage, the principal and the superintendent demanded that the teacher sign a “Last 
Chance Agreement,” which required, among other things, that he participate in a thirty-day rehabilitation treatment 
program, that he never drink alcohol again, and that he release all his medical records, or face termination. The 
teacher signed the agreement to avoid losing his job, even though he strongly disagreed with its terms. Later when 
the school district obtained the teacher’s medical records, the records revealed statements that the teacher had drank 
beer at a sports event and that he did not remain in the treatment program for thirty days. The school district 
terminated the teacher’s employment because of these violations. Id. 
 
57 Chadwell v. Brewer, 59 F. Supp. 3d 756, 759 (W.D. Va. 2014). 
 
58 Id. at 763. 
 
59 Id. 
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itself,” the court said the teacher “pleaded sufficient facts . . .  to suggest that he had at least some 
expectation of privacy in his office.”60 Having satisfied the beginning of the Fourth Amendment 
analysis, the court’s discussion then turned to whether the video search was reasonable. This 
issue will be discussed later in this chapter.  
School Employee Break Rooms 
 
There is only one case in which a court has discussed whether school employees have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a school break room. In Brannen v. Kings Local School 
District,61 the Court of Appeals of Ohio ruled third-shift custodians had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a public school break room.62 In this case, the supervisor of custodians 
installed a hidden camera in the employee break room when he suspected third-shift custodians 
of “taking unauthorized breaks for many hours, while turning in time sheets indicating they had 
worked their full eight-hour shifts.”63 The Ohio Association of Public School Employees 
negotiated a settlement between the district and the third-shift custodians so that the custodians 
would not be terminated for cheating the school district.64 The custodians signed the agreement, 
admitting to taking unauthorized breaks during regular shifts, agreed to a suspension, and agreed 
to have their paychecks docked.65 The custodians then filed a lawsuit against the district, alleging 
that the installation of the hidden video camera in the break room violated their Fourth 
                                                
60 Id.; O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 730 (1987) (“It is privacy that is protected by the Fourth Amendment, not 
solitude.”) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 
61 761 N.E.2d 620 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). 
 
62 Id. at 630. 
 
63 Id. at 626. 
 
64 Id. 
 
65 Id. 
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Amendment right to be free from unlawful searches.66 The court held that the custodians did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the break room.67 The court explained the break 
room was more like an all-purpose utility room than a break room. It contained a washing 
machine, clothes dryer, cleaning supplies, cleaning machines, lockers, a refrigerator, and a 
microwave oven.68 The teachers and principal had “unfettered access” to this room.69 One 
custodian described the break room as “open all the time.”70 The court concluded, “The break 
room was so open to fellow employees that the custodians could not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in this area.”71 Because the custodians had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the break room, they could not successfully claim that the school district violated their 
Fourth Amendment rights.72  
School Classrooms 
 
Courts are in consensus that school employees have no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in a classroom. In Plock v. Board of Education of Freeport School District Number 145,73 the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that “teachers had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in communications in their classrooms, as required to challenge audio 
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monitoring under the Fourth Amendment.”74 In this case, parents who suspected teachers’ aides 
were abusing children in special-education classrooms requested that the district install audio and 
video recording equipment in special-education classrooms.75 When the district notified the 
teachers and the aides of its intent to install the audio and video recording equipment, the 
teachers sought to enjoin the district from carrying out some aspects of the district’s proposed 
video surveillance plan.76 The court held that the teachers and aides did not have reasonable 
expectations of privacy in their classrooms that would allow them to challenge the surveillance.77 
The Plock court first explained the nature of a classroom was such that teachers could not expect 
to have privacy. According to the court: “A classroom in a public school is not the private 
property of any teacher. A classroom is a public space in which government employees 
communicate with members of the public. There is nothing private about communications which 
take place in such a setting.”78 The court emphasized the fact that teachers do not have exclusive 
use in a classroom.79 According to the court, “Classrooms are open to students, other faculty, 
administrators, substitute teachers, custodians, and on occasion, parents,” and “[w]hat is said and 
done in a public classroom is not merely liable to being overheard and repeated, but is likely to 
be overheard and repeated.”80 Thus, the Plock court concluded that the plaintiff school teachers 
did not have an expectation of privacy in their classrooms which society was willing to recognize 
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as reasonable.81 Because the search here was not recognized under the Fourth Amendment, the 
court did not go on to discuss the reasonableness of the search.82 
In State v. McLellan,83 the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a school custodian 
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment to 
challenge school video surveillance that showed him stealing money from a teacher's desk.84 In 
this case, a police sergeant installed a video camera in a classroom where thefts had occurred.85 
The sergeant also placed an envelope containing $26.91 in the teacher’s desk drawer.86 When the 
sergeant reviewed the videotapes, he saw the defendant custodian remove the envelope from the 
desk.87 The custodian was charged with two misdemeanor counts of theft.88 The custodian 
moved to suppress the video surveillance evidence, asserting that it constituted an 
unconstitutional warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.89 The district court 
granted this motion.90 On appeal, the State argued that the custodian could not challenge the 
video surveillance because the video surveillance of the classroom did not constitute a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.91 The McLellan court agreed with the State.92 The 
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court held that the custodian did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the classroom 
because he did not enjoy exclusive use and control of the classroom.93 It was not the custodian’s 
personal space, even though he was the only one who had access to the classroom during the 
time when the video camera was set to record.94 On the contrary, the McLellan court described 
the classroom as open to students and school staff.95  
In Roberts v. Houston Independent School District,96 the Court of Appeals of Texas held 
that a school district could videotape a classroom teacher’s performance because a teacher has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy while teaching in a public classroom.97 In this case, the teacher 
was aware that the district was videotaping her, but she had objected to being recorded. 98 After 
reviewing the videotape, the school board terminated the teacher for incompetence and 
inefficiency.99 When a trial court affirmed the school district’s decision, the teacher appealed and 
argued that the termination proceedings violated her right of privacy.100 The Roberts court 
rejected the teacher’s claim because it said the teacher had not demonstrated that she had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in her classroom. According to the record in this case: “[T]he 
appellant was videotaped in a public classroom in full view of her students, faculty members, 
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and administrators. At no point, did the school district attempt to record the appellant’s private 
affairs”101 According to the Roberts court, “The activity of teaching in a public classroom does 
not fall within the expected zone of privacy.”102  
School Buses 
 
Only one court has considered whether a bus driver has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy on a public school bus. In Goodwin v. Moyer,103 the U.S. District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania ruled that a school bus driver had a “diminished expectation of privacy” 
on a public school bus with student passengers.104 In this case, the school district said it installed 
a video camera in the school bus with the bus driver’s knowledge.105 The surveillance video 
revealed that the bus driver “had let a little girl walk from the mini-mart on Route 292 to her 
home in a trailer park” instead of dropping her off at home as his job required.106 The school 
district used this evidence as a basis for the bus driver’s termination, and the bus driver filed a 
complaint against the school district for invasion of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.107 
According to the Goodwin court, the bus driver could not expect that his statements on the bus 
would be kept private because bus drivers enjoy “a diminished expectation of privacy.”108 The 
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court explained that bus drivers enjoy a diminished expectation of privacy because they “[drive] 
children, for whom society has a special interest to protect from any misdeeds by the bus driver 
and from whose misdeeds society likewise has a special interest to protect the bus driver.”109  
A Search under the Fourth Amendment must be Reasonable 
If courts decide that a Fourth Amendment search has occurred, the next step is to 
determine whether the search was reasonable.110 To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, 
most searches must be pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause.111 However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has said that there are circumstances in which “strict adherence to the 
requirement that searches be based on probable cause [is not required].”112 Instead of requiring a 
warrant in student search cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has said courts must “strike the balance 
between the school child’s legitimate expectations of privacy and the school’s equally legitimate 
need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place.”113 Instead of requiring a 
warrant in school employee cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has said courts must balance the 
employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy with the government’s need for supervision, 
control, and the efficient operation of the workplace to determine the constitutionality of 
                                                
109 Id. 
 
110 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 326 (1985); Brannum v. Overton Cty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 495 (6th Cir. 
2008) ( “[T]he ultimate measure of the constitutionality of [a search] is one of ‘reasonableness.’”) 
 
111 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, most searches 
must be pursuant to a warrant. A warrant will be issued only if there is probable cause to believe that seizable 
evidence will be found on the premises or person to be searched. The Supreme Court, however, has held that school 
officials can search students based on a standard that is lower than probable cause. School officials need only 
reasonable suspicion of wronging to conduct a search. According to the Supreme Court, the nature of the school 
environment justifies this exception. Id. 
 
112 Id. at 341. “Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its 
balancing of interests for that of the Framers.” Id. at 351. 
 
113 Id. at 326. 
 35 
searches conducted by government employers.114 For both students and school employees, the 
legality of a search depends on reasonableness.115 
Determining the reasonableness of any search conducted by school officials involves a 
twofold inquiry: (1) whether the search was justified at its inception, and (2) whether the search 
was permissible in its scope.116 A student search is justified at its inception when there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has 
violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.117 An employee search is justified 
at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up 
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.118 Then, according to the 
Supreme Court, a student search is permissible in its scope when “the measures adopted are 
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age 
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”119 Similarly, courts determine whether an 
employee search is permissible in its scope by considering whether “the measures adopted are 
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of . . .  the 
nature of the [misconduct].”120 Two courts balanced the plaintiff’s privacy interest, the nature 
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and extent of the intrusion, and the government’s compelling interest to determine whether the 
search was reasonable in scope.121  
Justified at its Inception 
Courts have yet to find that a school’s decision to record its students and school 
employees was not justified. In the one student case, in this section, the school subjected students 
to video surveillance for security reasons, and the court concluded the video surveillance was 
justified at its inception. In each of the three school employee cases in this section, the school 
decided to record its employee because it suspected the employee of misconduct.  
In Brannum v. Overton County School Board,122 the Sixth Circuit concluded that the 
school district’s act of installing cameras inside the boys’ and girls’ locker rooms for security 
reasons was justified at its inception.123 The court explained that recording students for security 
reasons was “an appropriate and common sense purpose and not one subject to our judicial 
veto.”124 In doing so, it appears that the Brannum court has given away the inception test, finding 
that there are no conceivable circumstances in which video surveillance of students might not be 
justified for security reasons. The Brannum court, however returns to this issue when it discussed 
whether the school video surveillance was permissible in scope. This will be discussed in the 
next section. On the other hand, courts are much more demanding when determining whether the 
video surveillance of school employees was justified at its inception. In Chadwell v. Brewer,125 
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia found the school district’s decision to 
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video record a teacher in his shared office was justified at its inception because the school district 
suspected, and the surveillance video confirmed, that the teacher was drinking beer during the 
school day.126 In Brannen v. Kings Local School District Board of Education,127 the Court of 
Appeals of Ohio considered whether installing cameras and recording third-shift custodians in a 
school break room was justified at its inception.128 The Brannen court said the search was 
justified because the custodians were suspected of “taking excessive, unauthorized breaks.”129 
Finally, in John Doe (1-3) v. Dearborn Public School,130 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan found that the video search of gym teachers in their locker room/office 
(where they changed clothes) to be an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, but 
held the search might have been justified at its inception because it was used to determine 
whether employees were stealing.131  
Permissible in its Scope 
In addition to being justified at its inception, a search must also be permissible in its 
scope. There is only one case in which students have challenged school video surveillance under 
the Fourth Amendment, and, in that case, the court found the video surveillance was not 
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permissible in scope. In Brannum v. Overton County School Board,132 the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit found the school district’s hidden video surveillance of middle school 
students in a locker room where they changed clothes was not permissible in scope.133 The court 
reached this conclusion by interpreting the U.S. Supreme Court’s “permissible in scope” 
instructions as a balancing test.134 The Sixth Circuit “balance[ed] the scope and the manner in 
which the search [was] conducted in light of the students’ reasonable expectations of privacy, the 
nature of the intrusion, and the severity of the school officials’ need in enacting such policies.”135 
In doing so, the Sixth Circuit first acknowledged that students had reasonable expectations of 
privacy that they would not be recorded in a locker room where they changed clothes.136 Second, 
the Sixth Circuit discussed the nature of the intrusion and decided “video surveillance is 
inherently intrusive . . . [because] a video camera sees all and forgets nothing,137 The court also 
determined that the scope of the surveillance in this case, which consisted of the video recording 
and image storage of the children while changing their clothes, was intrusive because “the school 
officials wholly failed to institute any policies designed to protect the privacy of the students and 
did not even advise the students or their parents that they were being videotaped.”138 Taken 
together, the first and the second factors show that the school district significantly intruded on 
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the students’ privacy.139 The third factor required that the court consider the severity of the 
school officials’ need to place surveillance cameras in locker rooms. This factor also seemed to 
better address the first prong of the reasonableness test – whether the search was justified in its 
inception – because the court takes a close look at whether the video surveillance was justified 
based on the facts of the case rather than it being accepted as a general security measure. The 
record in this case showed there was no history of misconduct in the school locker room, and the 
records suggest that the school board members were not even aware that the locker rooms were 
under school video surveillance.140 The court explained, “As the commonly understood 
expectation for privacy increases, the range and nature of permissible government intrusion 
decreases.”141 This led the Sixth Circuit to determine the video surveillance in this case was 
excessive in its scope.142 Then the court balanced all factors together and said:  
Given the universal understanding among middle school age children in this 
country that a school locker room is a place of heightened privacy, we believe 
placing cameras in such a way so as to view the children dressing and undressing 
in a locker room is incongruent to any demonstrated necessity, and wholly 
disproportionate to the claimed policy goal of assuring increased school security, 
especially when there is no history of any threat to security in the locker rooms.143 
 
Thus, the court concluded that the school’s surveillance of students undressing in a school locker 
room “was a search, unreasonable in its scope,[that] violated the students’ Fourth Amendment 
privacy rights.”144  
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One court found the school video surveillance of school employees was not permissible 
in scope, and, therefore, the surveillance was determined to be an unreasonable search under the 
Fourth Amendment. In John Doe (1-3) v. Dearborn Public School,145 the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Michigan found the school district’s hidden video surveillance of gym 
teachers in their office, which was located inside a boys’ locker room, was not permissible in its 
scope.146 In this case, one of several gym teachers was suspected of theft.147 First, the court said, 
“there are genuine issues of fact as to whether the measures adopted were reasonably related to 
the objectives of the search” because the school subjected more than the person who was 
suspected of theft to video surveillance.148 Second, the court said the surveillance might have 
been excessively intrusive because the office was located in the boys’ bathroom where the gym 
teachers changed clothes.149 The Dearborn court expressed concerns about the length of time 
employees were subjected to recording and how those recordings were stored and maintained.150 
The recorded images lasted for at least thirty days and could have easily been copied or burned 
onto a CD.151 The district claimed that no one saw the live video, yet the assistant principal 
testified he inadvertently saw an image of the gym teachers when he was walking by the 
principal’s office.”152 The court wondered, “What [] is the purpose of videotaping the office if no 
one is watching the monitor or reviewing the recorded images,” especially given the fact that the 
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school district’s stated purpose for videotaping the office was to catch one gym teacher in the act 
of stealing?153 Therefore, the court determined the video surveillance was not permissible in 
scope, making it an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.154  
 Three courts have found video surveillance of school employees to be permissible in 
scope. In Chadwell v. Brewer,155 the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia 
found the school district’s hidden video surveillance of a teacher in his office to be permissible in 
scope because the district’s surveillance measures were reasonably related to the objectives of 
the surveillance and not excessively intrusive in relationship to the nature of the teacher’s 
suspected misconduct.156 The Chadwell court did not find the school district’s surveillance 
measures to be a point of contention. The court simply stated, “[The school district’s] hidden 
video surveillance was certainly reasonably related to determining whether [the teacher] was 
drinking in his office” without further discussion.157 The court, however, addressed the teacher’s 
reliance on dicta from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to make his argument that 
the school’s search method was excessively intrusive.158 In criminal opinions, the Ninth Circuit 
has noted, “Video surveillance can result in extraordinarily serious intrusions into personal 
privacy.”159 While the Chadwell court acknowledged that “surreptitious video surveillance 
presents unique constitutional concerns,” the Chadwell court said, “An employer’s work-related 
search of an employee’s office is judged by a reasonable standard that is less stringent than the 
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probable cause and warrant requirements imposed on law enforcement officials in the criminal 
context.”160 The court found “it difficult to believe that a hidden camera used over a limited 
period of time to confirm or deny [the school district’s] suspicion regarding [the teacher] 
drinking alcohol on the job, would violate [the teacher’s] constitutional rights.”161 The fact that 
the teacher had “significant responsibilities as a special education teacher and the 
correspondingly severe consequences that result from his misconduct” contributed to the court’s 
decision that the video surveillance in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment.162  
In Brannen v. Kings Local School District Board of Education,163 the Court of Appeals of  
Ohio found the school district’s hidden video surveillance of custodians in a school break room 
to be permissible in scope because the district’s surveillance measures were reasonably related to 
the objectives of the surveillance and not excessively intrusive in relationship to the nature of the 
custodians’ suspected misconduct.164 In this case, the custodians were suspected of taking 
unauthorized breaks for many hours, while indicating on their time sheets that they had worked 
full eight-hour shifts.165 The Brannen court said the surveillance measures were reasonable 
because “[t]he video camera was installed solely for the purpose of confirming or denying” 
allegations that the custodians were taking unauthorized breaks.166 The court also determined 
that the surveillance was not excessively intrusive because “[t]he video camera created only a 
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visual record of the activities in the break room; it did not record private conversations.”167 
Furthermore, the court said, “The camera was operational only between 10:00 p.m. and 6 a.m. 
for one week,” and “[t]he camera recorded only that which the [custodian supervisor] could have 
observed in person.”168 The court explained, “The mere fact that the observation is accompanied 
by a video camera rather than the naked eye, and recorded on film rather than in a supervisor’s 
memory, does not transmogrify a constitutionally innocent act into a constitutional forbidden 
one.”169 Thus, the video search of custodians in a break room was deemed reasonable, so no 
Fourth Amendment violation had occurred.170   
In Goodwin v. Moyer,171 the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
ruled the school video surveillance of a bus driver was permissible in scope.172 The Goodwin 
court did not use the two-part test to determine the reasonableness of a search conducted by a 
government employer.173 Instead, the court balanced the following factors:  
(1) whether the plaintiff's privacy interest is objectively legitimate as recognized 
by society; (2) the nature and extent of the intrusion; and (3) whether the 
government has a compelling interest in intruding upon the plaintiff's privacy.174 
 
First, the court determined that the bus drive enjoyed a “diminished expectation of privacy” 
because he was a bus driver who drove children “for whom society has a special interest to 
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protect from any misdeed by the bus driver and from whose misdeeds society likewise has a 
special interest to protect the bus driver.”175 Second, the court found cameras on the bus to be an 
“insignificant intrusion” on the bus driver’s privacy because the bus driver “was not located in a 
private area; he was in a public conveyance surrounded by others and in view of the public 
through the bus's windows.”176 The court also determined the intrusion in this case was 
insignificant because the camera “capture[d] the entire activity of the bus as it shuttle[d] children 
to and from school,” rather than capturing the bus driver “engaged in acts of a private nature.”177 
Finally, the court determined “the government has a compelling interest in protecting children 
entrusted to it, as well as protecting the bus driver from the children.”178 Because each of these 
factors weighed in favor of recording the bus driver, the court held that the bus driver did not 
“suffer[] an unreasonable deprivation of his Fourth Amendment right to privacy.”179 
Right to Privacy under State Constitutions 
 
There are two cases in which school employees unsuccessfully challenged school video 
surveillance under their state constitutions. One case turned on the fact that teachers had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their office. In that case, a reasonable expectation of privacy 
was required to pursue a California constitutional law privacy claim. In the other case, a 
custodian argued that he had automatic standing to challenge the school’s video surveillance 
under the New Hampshire Constitution, but the court disagreed. Automatic standing would have 
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allowed the custodian to challenge the video surveillance even if he did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the area begin surveilled. 
California  
 
The California state constitution states: “All people are by nature free and independent 
and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, 
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and 
privacy.”180 According to the Supreme Court of California, to pursue a constitutional privacy 
claim, the plaintiff must first show a significant intrusion on a privacy interest based on three 
threshold elements: “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by the defendant constituting a serious invasion of 
privacy.”181 Once a plaintiff shows a “genuine, nontrivial invasion of a protected privacy 
interest,” the defendant must then provide an explanation or justification for the conduct.182  
In an unpublished opinion, Crist v. Alpine Union School District,183 the California Fourth 
District Court of Appeals held that two teachers’ aides who were filmed in their computer lab 
office did not have a right to be free from school video surveillance under their state constitution. 
In this case, the school district placed a hidden camera in the teachers’ shared office because it 
suspected the night custodian was engaging in unauthorized computer use.184 Within a few 
weeks, the surveillance tape showed the night custodian burning CDs on the office computer.185 
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The two teachers argued that the school district violated their privacy rights with its attempt to 
catch the night custodian’s misconduct.186 In analyzing this claim, the court focused its 
discussion on the second and third elements that are required to pursue a constitutional privacy 
claim in California.187 The court found the teachers had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the office because of where their office was located and how it was used. The office was located 
in the back corner of the computer lab, and, even though it had no lock, school employees and 
students would knock on the door to the computer lab office before entering when the door was 
closed.188 Next the court looked at whether the school district’s conduct was a serious invasion of 
privacy. The court explained that it was not; the district’s video recording was very limited 
because the camera was positioned in such a way that only the immediate area around the 
computer was filmed, and the recording was set to start only after school hours when the teachers 
were scheduled to be off work.189 Finally, the court said the school district’s invasion was 
justified.190 In this case, the court determined that unauthorized computer use was a serious 
matter that warranted the district taking steps to support a disciplinary action against the 
employee.191 Based on this analysis, the court ruled in favor of the school district, holding the 
“strong justification for, and limited nature of, the intrusion, tipped the balance against [the 
teachers].”192  
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New Hampshire 
 
Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution mirrors the Fourth Amendment, but 
it provides greater protection for individual rights than its federal counterpart.193 While the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court (interpreting the New Hampshire Constitution) and the U.S. Supreme 
Court (interpreting the U.S. Constitution) have developed standing doctrines, it is easier for a 
defendant to establish standing under the New Hampshire Constitution. Standing doctrines 
regulate who may seek the exclusion of evidence from a criminal trial on the grounds that the 
police discovered evidence during an unconstitutional search or seizure.194 The U.S. Supreme 
Court uses the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, which determines whether a Fourth 
Amendment search has occurred, to decide whether a defendant has standing to challenge a 
search.195 Under the New Hampshire Constitution, “[e]very subject hath a right to be secure from 
all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all 
possessions.”196 The New Hampshire Supreme Court, emphasizing the word “all” in that 
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provision, has held that the New Hampshire Constitution affords greater protection than the U.S. 
Constitution because it grants automatic standing to all persons charged with crimes in which 
their possession of any item or thing is an element of the crime.197 In cases not involving 
possessory offenses, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has employed the Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test to decide the issue of standing.198  
In State v. McLellan,199 the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a school custodian 
who was videotaped stealing money from a teacher’s desk in a classroom did not qualify for 
automatic standing under the New Hampshire Constitution.200 The court determined the 
custodian had no “possessory interest in the classroom, desk, or money prior to the time of the 
offending act.”201 Therefore, he could not challenge the school video surveillance under the New 
Hampshire constitution.202 The custodian argued for automatic standing under the New 
Hampshire constitution just in case the court determined he did not have the reasonable 
expectation of privacy required to challenge school video surveillance under the Fourth 
Amendment.203 
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Common Law Right to Privacy 
School employees who challenged school video surveillance of their school offices under 
the common law tort of intrusion were only successful when they challenged the video 
surveillance of an office where they changed clothes. Courts considered the location in which the 
employees were recorded and the scope of the recording to reach their conclusions.  
 In John Doe (1-3) v. Dearborn Public School, 204 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan found that gym teachers who were subjected to school video surveillance in 
their office that was located in a boys’ locker room stated a prima facie case on their invasion of 
privacy claim. The Dearborn court explained that “[i]n order for Plaintiffs to state a cause of 
action based on an invasion of privacy claim, they must demonstrate: 1) an intrusion; 2) into a 
matter in which the Plaintiffs had a right of privacy; and, 3) by means that would be 
objectionable to a reasonable person.”205 First, the court found the gym teachers could show the 
school district’s act of placing cameras in the gym teachers’ office was an intrusion.206 Second, 
the gym teachers were able to demonstrate they had a right of privacy in changing clothes in 
their office and “reasonable persons would object to such surveillance.”207 Finally, the court said 
the intrusion in this case was conducted in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person. The 
court explained that Brannum v. Overton County School Board, the case in which a school 
district videotaped middle-school students changing clothes in a school locker room, was on 
point and applied to school district employees as well as students.208 When it comes to video 
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recording areas on campus where people undress, the Brannum court said and this Dearborn 
court agreed that “[s]ome personal liberties are so fundamental to human dignity as to need no 
specific explication in our Constitution in order to ensure their protection against government 
invasion.”209 Therefore, the gym teachers successfully challenged the school video surveillance 
with an intrusion upon seclusion claim in addition to their Fourth Amendment claim.    
In an unpublished state court opinion, Crist v. Alpine Union School District,210 the 
California Fourth District Court of Appeal held that teachers who were recorded in a computer 
lab office failed to establish their common law invasion of privacy claim. The court explained 
that “the plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant intruded into a place, conversation or 
matter where the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, and (2) the 
intrusion was conducted in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person” in order to prove 
the tort of intrusion.211 In this case, the school district installed the cameras to catch the custodian 
whom they suspected of unauthorized computer use.212 When the teachers found out that they 
were being recorded, they alleged they suffered from emotional distress.213 The Crist court 
agreed that under the circumstances of this case, the teachers could legitimately assert a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the computer office, but the court held “there was no 
privacy violation as a matter of law because the record shows a limited intrusion and a strong 
justification for the intrusion.”214 The court said the intrusion was limited because the district 
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installed the camera in such a way that it pointed directly at the computer and was only turned on 
after hours when the unauthorized computer use was occurring.215 The court also said the district 
had a strong justification for the intrusion because “[u]nauthorized use of the computer system is 
a serious matter . . . [and the] District had a right to engage in the videotaping to obtain 
incontrovertible proof of the identity of the culprit and to support a disciplinary action against the 
employee.”216 Thus, the teachers were not successful in their invasion of privacy claim because 
the school district narrowly tailored its surveillance as to time, location, and scope, and engaged 
in the conduct for a legitimate purpose. 
Rights under State Eavesdropping Laws 
 
There are four cases in which school employees have challenged video surveillance under 
state eavesdropping statutes. All but one of these cases were unsuccessful. Teachers successfully 
challenged a school’s plan to audio record their classroom under a state’s two-party consent 
eavesdropping law. In the cases in which the school employees were unsuccessful, courts found 
that they failed to show that the recording they were subjected to was the type of recording that 
was/is prohibited in the states’ eavesdropping statutes.  
In Plock v. Board of Education of Freeport School District Number 145,217 the Illinois 
Second District Appellate Court held a school district’s proposed plan to audio record its 
teachers and teachers’ aides in a special education classroom violated the Illinois Eavesdropping 
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Act. 218 The Illinois Eavesdropping Act provides that one commits eavesdropping when she 
“[k]nowingly and intentionally uses an eavesdropping device for the purpose of hearing or 
recording all or any part of any conversation” without the consent of all parties to the 
conversation.219 The Illinois Eavesdropping Act defines a “conversation” as “any oral 
communication between 2 or more persons regardless of whether one or more of the parties 
intended their communication to be of a private nature under circumstances justifying that 
expectation.”220 The teachers argued that the school district’s plan would violate the state’s 
eavesdropping law because the teachers did not consent to the school’s plan to audio record their 
classroom.221 In response, the school district argued that the teacher’s classroom instruction was 
like a public speech, 222 which did not fall under the Illinois Eavesdropping Act’s definition of 
“conversation.”223 The 2009 Plock court distinguished special education classroom instruction 
from a speech at a public event, explaining that “[a]t lower levels of education . . . teachers are 
providing the students instruction and guidance on acquiring independent living skills. This 
necessarily requires ongoing oral exchanges between teachers and students.”224 The court further 
explained that “teachers imparting knowledge to students and the students asking and answering 
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. . .  questions is easily distinguishable from public speeches.” 225 The school district also argued 
that the teachers could be audio recorded in their classroom because in 2007 a federal district 
court determined that teachers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
classrooms.226 However, the 2009 Plock court found that the Illinois Eavesdropping Act clearly 
states that it applies to any conversation “regardless of whether any party has an objective or 
subjective expectation of privacy.”227 Therefore, the court concluded that the school district’s 
plan to audio record its teachers would violate the state’s eavesdropping act.228  
In that same case, the Illinois Second District Appellate Court was not persuaded by the 
school district’s argument that the Illinois Eavesdropping Act should not apply to the recording 
of school classrooms for public policy reasons. The school district “maintain[ed] that its 
proposed policy [would serve] the public interest by protecting both students and teachers.”229 In 
response, the court said, “[A] court cannot rewrite statutes to make them consistent with the 
court’s idea of orderliness and public policy.”230 The court also explained: “[T]he protection of 
students and teachers is not the only public policy at issue in this case. There is also the public 
policy of protecting the rights of Illinois citizens via the guidelines set forth in the [Illinois 
Eavesdropping Act].”231 The court said that teacher presence and, periodically, administrator 
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presence in the classroom was another means to protect teachers and students.232 Of the cases 
reviewed for this thesis, the 2009 Plock court is the only court that discussed a way to protect 
students and teachers without the use of audio or video surveillance.  
The remaining cases in this part of the chapter discuss school employees’ unsuccessful 
state eavesdropping claims. In People v. Drennan,233 California’s Third District Court of Appeal 
held that California’s eavesdropping law,234 which prohibits intentional eavesdropping upon or 
recording of a confidential communication, did not apply to a school district that silently 
videotaped a school employee in his office.235 The court held that California’s eavesdropping law 
requires sound-based or symbol-based communication.236 In this case, a California school 
superintendent hid a video camera in a smoke detector in a principal’s office to determine if 
someone was breaking into the office to take confidential documents.237 The principal argued the 
superintendent’s silent recording was a violation of California’s eavesdropping law.238  The court 
reviewed the statute and found that it was “replete with words indicating the Legislature's intent 
to protect only sound-based or symbol-based communications.”239 For example, one subdivision 
of California’s eavesdropping law “prohibits the use of ‘amplifying’ devices by which to 
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‘eavesdrop’ on a communication that otherwise could not be overheard.”240 That subdivision also 
“makes clear that such communication may be carried on by ‘telegraph, telephone, or other 
device,’ which transmit information by sound or symbol.”241 Thus, the court concluded that the 
superintendent’s actions did not violate California’s eavesdropping law because there was no 
sound recording, and sound was required to meet the definition of “communication” within the 
statute.242  
In Evens v. Superior Court,243 the California Court of Appeals concluded that a school 
board could use an illegally obtained video-recording of a teacher in her disciplinary proceeding, 
even though California’s eavesdropping law prohibits intentional eavesdropping upon or 
recording of a confidential communication,244 and California’s Education Code prohibits “any 
person, including a pupil,” from using a recording device in any classroom without the teacher’s 
consent.245 In this case, two students surreptitiously recorded their science teacher in class.246 
The teacher argued that the recording should not be used against her because California’s privacy 
laws “read together mandate that evidence obtained as a result of unconsented recordings” is not 
admissible in school disciplinary actions.247 The California Court of Appeals reviewed 
California’s Education Code and determined that “it provides sanctions against violators but does 
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not specifically prohibit entities such as the Board . . . from using [the] videotape.”248 The 
California Court of Appeals reviewed California’s eavesdropping law and determined that it 
prohibited  “evidence obtained as a result of eavesdropping upon or recording a confidential 
communication . . . [from being admitted] in any judicial, administrative, legislative, or other 
proceeding,” but it did not apply in this case. Under California’s eavesdropping law, “A 
confidential communication is one carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that 
any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto.”  The teacher who 
was recorded contended that she “had every expectation that her communications and activities 
would be confined to the classroom and not be subject to public dissemination” because the 
California Education code prohibits unauthorized recordings in classrooms.249 The court said the 
teacher’s expectations were unreasonable.  The court explained:  
Communications and activities on the part of a teacher will virtually never be 
confined to the classroom. Students will, and usually do, discuss a teacher's 
communications and activities with their parents, other students, other teachers, 
and administrators. This is especially true when a student believes that the teacher 
is guilty of misconduct. A teacher must always expect “public dissemination” of 
his or her classroom “communications and activities.”250 
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Thus, the court concluded,“[T]he videotape recording at issue here was made in a public 
classroom, and is clearly not the type of ‘confidential communication’ contemplated by 
[California’s eavesdropping law].”251  
In State v. Duchow,252 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a bus driver’s 
statements to a student were not “oral communications,” which would be prohibited from being 
recorded under Wisconsin’s eavesdropping law, because the bus driver had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his statements.253 In this case, a bus driver moved to suppress a 
recording under Wisconsin’s eavesdropping law when he was charged with abusing a student 
who rode the bus.254 The parents who suspected that their child was being abused placed a voice-
activated tape recorder in their child’s backpack.255 The following comments were made by the 
bus driver and caught on tape: “Stop before I beat the living hell out of you . . . . You’d better get 
your damn legs in now” . . . . [and] “Do you want me to come back there and smack you?”256 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied the bus driver’s motion to suppress these tape-recorded 
statements because they were not “oral communications” within the state’s eavesdropping law.257 
Under Wisconsin’s eavesdropping law, an “oral communication” is “any oral communication 
uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to 
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interception under circumstances justifying that expectation.”258 The court determined that 
Wisconsin’s eavesdropping law incorporated the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy 
standard into the act’s definition of “oral communication.”259 This case, therefore, turned on 
whether the bus driver had a reasonable expectation of privacy that his statements made on a 
public school bus would not be recorded.260 The court said the bus driver had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his statements because his statements were made in a public location 
and under circumstances in which he would likely be reported.261 The court first considered the 
place where the bus driver spoke and, relying on Plock v. Board of Education of Freeport School 
District, determined that “[s]chool bus drivers endure a [] diminished expectation of privacy 
inside the school buses they operate . . . [because] society, as well as the government, retains an 
interest in ensuring that the children and the bus driver alike are protected from ‘misdeeds’ 
against each other.”262 Then the court explained that the bus driver in this case had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his recorded statements because (1) the bus was public property, being 
operated for a public purpose, (2) the bus had “windows through which [the bus driver] and [the 
student] could be seen,”263 and (3) he made the threats while the child was being transported to 
school, a circumstance in which he would likely be reported.264 Wisconsin’s eavesdropping law 
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only protects “oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that the 
communication is not subject to interception,” and, in this case, the bus driver had no reasonable 
expectation that his statements would be kept private.265 
Rights under School Policies 
Students and teachers can also sue school districts for violating their own policies.  
Roberts v. Houston Independent School District266 provides an example of a case in which a 
teacher unsuccessfully challenged the school district that recorded her classroom performance 
over her objections, citing an obsolete school policy.267 In this case, a section of the school 
district’s older manual provided, “No mechanical or electronic device shall be utilized to listen to 
or record the procedures unless requested or permitted by the teacher.”268 However, the school 
updated the manual to include guidelines on videotaping teachers for quality assurance before 
recording the teacher.269 The court held that the adoption of the new manual with guidelines for 
recording teachers superseded all prior policies and procedures of the old manual.270 According 
to the court, “[T]he new section expressly authorizes the principal to make arrangements for 
videotaping, and [it] does not require that the teacher must request or give consent to the 
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videotaping.”271 Based on this analysis, the court concluded that the videotaping of the teacher 
did not violate any of the school district's policies or procedures. 272 While the school’s new 
policy failed to protect the teacher from school video surveillance, it is clear that a school policy 
could offer students privacy protections beyond state and federal law.  
Conclusions 
This chapter took a close look at school video surveillance case law pertaining to both 
students and school employees to determine what legal rights, if any, students have to be free 
from school video surveillance in public school settings. Students have a constitutional right to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Video 
surveillance in areas where students have a reasonable expectation of privacy is considered a 
Fourth Amendment search, which will be deemed unreasonable if it is not justified in its 
inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the search in the 
first place. There has only been one court decision regarding the Fourth Amendment rights of 
students to be free from school video surveillance. The Sixth Circuit held students have a 
constitutionally protected privacy right not to be surreptitiously videotaped in areas where 
students may dress and undress. It found the school district’s recording of students in school 
lockers rooms to be an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Similarly, in John 
Doe (1-3) v. Dearborn Public School, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
found the surreptitious recording of gym teachers in their locker room/office to be an 
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Like the students in Brannum, the gym 
teachers expected that they would not be recorded in an area where they changed clothes, and 
that expectation was reasonable. 
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Courts have yet to find that students or school employees have a constitutionally 
protected right not to be videotaped in other areas on a school’s campus. Courts have determined 
school employees have no reasonable expectations of privacy in their classrooms or break rooms. 
Schools were therefore able to record school employees in those areas without violating their 
Fourth Amendment rights. Courts have determined school employees have a reduced or 
“diminished expectation of privacy” in their offices and on buses. Schools still were able to 
record school employees in their offices or on buses because the recordings were determined to 
be reasonable (justified at inception and permissible in scope). In summary, schools have 
recorded school employees in classrooms, offices, break rooms, and buses without violating their 
Fourth Amendment rights.   
School employees have also challenged school video surveillance under state 
constitutions, state tort law, and state eavesdropping statutes. Only two of the eight cases that 
were reviewed were successful. One of those cases was a tort law case involving teachers 
changing clothes. The gym teachers in John Doe (1-3) v. Dearborn Public School were subjected 
to video surveillance of their locker room/office, and they successfully challenged the video 
surveillance under state tort law. It makes sense that they were successful under this claim 
because their Fourth Amendment challenge to the school’s video surveillance also was 
successful, and these claims involved similar analyses. Both the Fourth Amendment and the tort 
of intrusion require an intrusion in an area in which the individual has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. The special education teachers in Plock v. Board of Education of Freeport School 
District Number 145 who challenged the audio component of a school’s plan to video record 
their classroom were also successful. The court determined if the school district audio recorded 
the teachers without their consent, it would violate the state’s eavesdropping law. The Plock 
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court was the only court that discussed the nature of teachers-student conversations in a 
classroom and noted their interest in not having those conversations recorded. Teachers provide 
students guidance in addition to instruction. The Plock court was also the only court that 
discussed means of protecting students that did not involve video or audio surveillance. 
Discussing whether recordings may chill student learning or growth and whether a school can 
achieve its safety and security goals without video surveillance are factors that courts should 
consider in all school video surveillance cases involving students.  
Other school employees have not been successful in challenging school video 
surveillance under state law. Most claims turned on whether the plaintiff had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the area where she was recorded. For the same reasons brought forth 
under Fourth Amendment analyses, courts have found that school employees have either no 
expectation of privacy or a reduced expectation of privacy in areas on campus other than a 
school locker room. Three of eight cases had no discussion of an employee’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy because the cases were decided on other issues. In State v. McLellan, the 
court determined the custodian who stole money from a teacher’s classroom desk did not have 
standing to challenge the video surveillance under the New Hampshire constitution. The New 
Hampshire constitution requires discussion of the reasonable expectation of privacy, but the 
court’s analysis did not get that far. In People v. Drennan, the court considered whether silent 
recording qualified as eavesdropping on confidential communication, which was prohibited 
under California’s eavesdropping law. Finally Roberts v. Houston Independent School District 
discussed whether a school district had to honor its own policies.   
Suing school districts for violating their own policies gives students and staff another 
way to challenge school video surveillance. In order for this to work, the school must have a 
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policy that is protective of student and school employee privacy. Even if this is the case, 
students/staff must be aware that a school can change its policy at any time. For example, in 
Roberts v. Houston Independent School District, a school district had an old policy that 
prohibited the video recording of classrooms without the teacher’s request or permission. A 
teacher argued that the school violated this policy by recording her over her objections. The 
school district argued, and the court agreed, that the school district had not violated its own 
policies because it had recently adopted guidelines for recording teachers for evaluation 
purposes. Because the school determined this to be its new policy, the old policy was no longer 
applicable.  
Based on this case review, students have a right to be free from video surveillance in 
school locker rooms or other areas on campus that schools have designated for them to change 
clothes, but nowhere else. School employee cases suggest classrooms, break rooms, and buses 
are places where students can be recorded because, in case law, these places are often described 
as “accessible” or “public property, being operated for a public purpose.” Finally, the Supreme 
Court’s determination that “[s]tudents have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the 
population generally” further justifies a school’s decision to record students in those areas on a 
school’s campus.      
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CHAPTER 3: THE LEGALITY OF SHARING SCHOOL SURVEILLANCE VIDEOS 
 
 
Introduction 
Given a school’s broad authority to record its students and staff,1 the issue of who gets 
access to the surveillance footage after a student has been recorded is particularly salient. 
Controlling access is an important means to protect students’ privacy. This chapter takes a close 
look at the statutes, agency regulations and guidance, and court decisions that govern the 
disclosure of school surveillance videos to better understand who can obtain access to those 
videos and under what circumstances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
1 See, e.g., Chadwell v. Brewer, 59 F. Supp. 3d 756, 765 (W.D. Va. 2014) (holding a teacher who was suspected of 
drinking on the job had no constitutional right to privacy to be free from video surveillance in his school office); 
Plock v. Bd. of Educ. of Freeport Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 755, 758 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (holding teachers had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in communications in their classrooms, as required to challenge audio monitoring 
under the Fourth Amendment); Goodwin v. Moyer, 549 F. Supp. 2d 621, 633 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (holding a bus driver 
who was suspected of abusing a student enjoyed a diminished expectation of privacy on a school bus).  
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For the most part, one federal law – the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act2 
(FERPA) – governs the disclosure of school surveillance videos. The law applies to all schools, 
colleges, and universities that receive federal funding.3 When a school surveillance video is 
considered an “education record” under FERPA, it cannot be disclosed to the public without 
parental permission or the permission of a student who is eighteen or older. 4 Allowing parental 
access or access to students who are eighteen and over while limiting others’ access to school 
surveillance footage protects students’ privacy. Unfortunately, it is not always easy to determine 
what constitutes an education record under FERPA. For example, courts disagree about whether 
a video that is non-academic in nature should be considered an education record under FERPA.5   
Even if a school surveillance video is determined to be an education record under 
FERPA, the video can be disclosed to appropriate parties under certain circumstances. For 
example, a teacher can access education-record school surveillance videos if she has a legitimate 
educational interest, police and health care workers can access education-record school 
surveillance videos in emergency situations, and others can access education-record school 
surveillance videos if there is a court order. School surveillance videos that are not education 
records under FERPA can be disclosed to the public, if nothing in state laws prohibits it. While it 
is important to consider who is requesting access to the school surveillance video, that alone is 
                                                
2 20 U.S.C. 1232g (2006). 
 
3 Id. 
 
4 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(A) (2006) (defining “education records” as “those records, files, documents, and other 
materials which contain information directly related to the student and are maintained by an educational agency or 
institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution”). 
5 Compare Bryner v. Canyons Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 852. (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (finding that “nothing in the plain 
language of the statute limits the application of FERPA to only academic records. ), with Jacobson v. Ithaca City 
Sch. Dist., 53 Misc. 3d. 1091 (N.Y. Supp. Ct. 2016) (finding that the video at issue did not meet FERPA’s “directly 
related to a student” requirement because the video did not relate “in any way to the educational performance of the 
students depicted”). 
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not determinative of whether the record will be released. Disclosure of a school surveillance 
video, first and foremost, depends on whether it is categorized as an education record. 
Part I of this chapter will discuss school surveillance videos that are considered education 
records under FERPA, explaining who can access those education-record school surveillance 
videos under specific circumstances. Part II of this chapter will discuss school surveillance 
videos that are exempt from the definition of education records under FERPA, explaining who 
can access those videos under specific circumstances. Part III of this chapter will discuss state 
laws that govern the disclosure of school surveillance videos.  
School Surveillance Videos As Education Records under FERPA 
FERPA affords parents and students who have reached eighteen the right to access their 
education records, and it gives them some control over the disclosure of their education records 
to others. However, there are exceptions. Parental access rights may be limited when students 
other than their own children are in the video, and parents’ power to restrict disclosure to others 
does not apply in certain circumstances. Schools must release a student’s education record to 
school officials who have a legitimate educational interest, to persons charged with helping in 
health or emergency situations, and to persons designated in a court order.  
Parental Access and Control 
 
FERPA gives parents the right to inspect and review their children’s education records, 
the right to challenge the content of those education records, and the right to control the 
disclosure of education records containing their child’s personally identifiable information.6 
FERPA defines education records as records that are “(1) directly related to a student; and (2) 
                                                
6 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A)(2006). The ultimate enforcement of FERPA lies with the Secretary of the Department 
of Education, who may terminate funding to any school or program in violation of FERPA, but this has never 
happened. 
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maintained by an educational agency or institution.”7 FERPA definitions make it clear that 
education records may be in a teacher's desk, nurse's office, or principal's file, among other 
places, and that they are not strictly limited to documents in the student’s official file.8 FERPA 
regulations, which are administrative laws promulgated by the U.S. Department of Education, 
note that student information may be recorded in a variety of ways, "including, but not limited to, 
handwriting, print, computer media, video or audio tape, film, microfilm, and microfiche.”9 
Furthermore, FERPA regulations do not limit the definition of "personally identifiable 
information" to a student’s name.10 Personally identifiable information also includes the student's 
parent's name, the family's address, the student’s identification number or social security number, 
and any information that makes the student's identity easily traceable.11  
The U.S. Department of Education’s Family Policy Compliance Office (FPCO), which 
oversees institutional compliance with FERPA, has not issued formal guidance on the subject of 
school video surveillance maintained by schools. The FPCO has provided varying and 
conflicting informal guidance on school surveillance videos when questioned by parents, school 
districts, and state attorneys general.12  
                                                
7 Id. 
 
8 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A)(2006) (“[T]hose records, files, documents and other materials which: (1) contain 
information directly related to a student; and (2) are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a 
person acting for such agency or institution.”). The definition of FERPA was updated six weeks after it was enacted 
replacing a laundry list of specific record types with the current, broader definition of “education records.” The 
original definition of education records included academic work completed, attendance data, interest inventory 
results, health data, family background information, teacher or counselor ratings and observations, and verified 
reports of serious or recurrent behavior patterns, among other things. See Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 
No. 93-380 § 513, 88 Stat. 484 (1974) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1974)). 
 
9 34 C.F.R. § 99.3. 
 
10 Id.  
 
11 Id. 
 
12 The FPCO has an online library of FERPA letters on its website, but the FPCO letters on school video 
surveillance that are often cited by courts and scholars are not available on the website. 
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In 2004, in a letter responding to a parent complaint, the FPCO first said that a school 
surveillance video is an education record for all students who are recorded by a school’s video 
surveillance system.13 The FPCO directed schools to deny parental access to the video if there 
was more than one student in the video, unless the video was altered so the identities of other 
students were not disclosed.14 Alternatively, the parents of all other students who were in the 
video could consent to allow the parent who made the request to view the video.15 Even the 
parents of children in the background of the video had to be consulted before the video could be 
shared. 
Two years later, in 2006, the FPCO changed its position on the subject of school 
surveillance videos maintained by schools. This became apparent when the Texas attorney 
general issued opinions that said the FPCO had determined that a school surveillance video is an 
education record only for the students who are the focus of the video.16 This means that the 
parents of students who are involved in a fight, drug deal, or some other disturbance or 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
13 Bryner v. Canyons Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 852, 858 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Letter re: Berkeley County Sch. 
Dist., 7 FERPA Answer Book 40, 104 LRP Publications 44490 (Feb. 10, 2004)) (“If education records of a student 
contain information on more than one student, the parent requesting access to education records has the right to 
inspect and review, or be informed of, only the information in the record directly to his or her child . . . . If, on the 
other hand, another student is pictured fighting in the videotape, you would not have the right to inspect and review 
that portion of the videotape.”), but cf. Rome City Sch. Dist. v. Grifasi, 806 N.Y.S. 2d 381, 382 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) 
(holding non-academic videos made for security purposes were not “education records” under FERPA), and 
Lindeman v. Kilso Sch. Dist., 172 P. 3d 329 (Wash. 2007) (holding non-academic videos made for security purposes 
were not “student records” under Washington’s student privacy law). Not all courts followed the FPCO’s 2004 
guidance. See infra pp. 20–21, 26–27. 
 
14 Bryner v. Canyons Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 852, 858 (Utah Ct. App. 2015). 
 
15 Id. 
 
16 Bryner, 351 P.3d at 858 (citing Opinion of the Texas Attorney General, OR 2006-00484, 2006 WL 208275 (Tex. 
Att’y Gen. Jan. 13,2006) and Opinion of the Texas Attorney General, OR2006-07701 (July 18, 2006), which stated, 
("[T]he [FPCO] ... has determined that videotapes of this type do not constitute the education records of students 
who did not participate in the altercation.... The [FPCO] has, however, determined that the images of the students 
involved in the altercation do constitute the education records of those students. Thus, FERPA does apply to the 
students involved in the altercation."). 
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altercation are considered the focal point of the video, and those parents must consent for an 
outside party to review the video.17 The Texas attorney general also explained that the parents of 
children who are the focal point of the video could access the video without each other’s 
permission.18 On the other hand, the parents of students in the video who are walking down the 
hall, sitting on the bus, or eating lunch are deemed to be in the background, and those parents 
would not be able to access the video or veto the access of other parents.19  
The most up-to-date guidance on school video surveillance – a 2016 communication – 
has come from the National School Boards Association (NSBA) recounting what FPCO 
representatives have shared with the NSBA.20 The NSBA said, “In conference with FPCO, it is 
our understanding [that] . . . . If multiple students are the ‘focus’ of the video, all students and 
their parents may view the video, although the school may not give copies of the video to any of 
the parents without the consent of the other parents.”21 This is a change since 2006. NSBA also 
said that the FPCO has remained consistent in advising school districts that school surveillance 
videos of students who are not involved in an altercation are not education records under 
FERPA.22 However, according to the NSBA, the FPCO has made one small change to its 
guidance: “[I]f the school uses the video to find witnesses to the altercation and the students are 
                                                
17 Id. 
 
18 Id. 
 
19 See id. 
 
20 If the FPCO has issued guidance via response letters to inquiries, those letters have not been made public.  
 
21 Thomas E. Myers, 2016 FERPA Update: Back to the Basics (Or Back to the Future?), 2016 SCH. L. SEMINAR,  
(National School Boards Association, Fort Worth, TX ), Apr. 7–9, 2016, available at https://cdn-files.nsba.org/s3fs-
public/01-Myers-2016-FERPA-Update-Paper.pdf. 
 
22 Id. 
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named or used as witnesses, the video becomes the witnessing student’s education record also.”23 
This means that school surveillance videos could now be education records for certain students 
in the background. 
Two courts’ decisions in cases about individuals seeking copies of school surveillance 
videos turned on whether the videos at issue satisfied the statutory definition of education 
records under FERPA. The courts had differing opinions on whether non-academic videos 
should be considered education records under FERPA. In 2015, Bryner v. Canyons School 
District,24 the Utah Court of Appeals held that a school surveillance video of a fight among 
middle school students was an education record as defined by FERPA.25 The court also held that 
an unredacted copy of the video could not be released to the parent requesting the video because 
the video contained personally identifiable information of other students.26 In this case, Robert 
Bryner, the parent of a middle school student involved in a fight with other students outside of 
the classroom, requested a copy of the video under Utah’s public records laws, the Government 
Record Access and Management Act (GRAMA).27 The school district and later a trial court 
denied Bryner’s request because they found the video to be an education record for students 
other than Bryner’s child.28 Bryner argued that the video was not an education record because “it 
                                                
23 Id. It is up to schools to decide whether video images are “directly related” to students. See id. 
 
24  351 P.3d 852 (Utah Ct. App. 2015). The decision not to release the video in this case seems to align with the 
FPCO’s guidance that was shared with the NSBA. 
 
25 Id. at 859. 
 
26 Id. at 854 (“Because FERPA forbids release of the unredacted video, . . . the District may produce only a redacted 
copy and that Bryner is to bear the cost of that redaction.”). 
 
27 Id. at 855 (GRAMA is a series of laws designed to guarantee that the public has access to the records of 
government bodies at all levels in Utah). 
 
28 See Bryner, 351 P.3d 852, 855–58 (describing the video as “nothing more than a record of the actions of the 
students involved in the incident.”) Based on this description, the court did not consider whether the video would be 
an education record for students in the background because that was not an issue in this case. See id. 
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is nonacademic in nature and, therefore, is not the type of record FERPA was meant to 
protect.”29 In response to this argument, the court said, “[N]othing in the plain language of the 
statute limits the application of FERPA to only academic records.”30 The court, therefore, 
considered whether the video satisfied FERPA’s two elements of an education record. In order to 
qualify as an education record, the record first must contain information directly related to a 
student.31 The court found the images of students involved in the fight were directly related to 
students because those images identified the students.32 In order to qualify as an education 
record, the school must also maintain the record.33 Bryner argued the school district did not 
maintain the record because the video was not administered by educators or regularly reviewed 
by educators.34 The court did not find Bryner’s argument persuasive because, according to the 
court, “FERPA requires only that the record be maintained by or on behalf of an educational 
agency, not that educators themselves maintain the records or review them.”35 Thus, the court 
decided that the school surveillance video at issue here was an education record under FERPA.36 
And while FERPA gives parents the right to review and inspect education records, the court 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
29 Id. at 857. 
 
30 Bryner v. Canyons Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 852, 857 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (According to the court, a plain reading of 
FERPA's statutory language reveals that Congress intended for the definition of education records to be broad in 
scope).   
 
31 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(A) (2006). 
 
32 Bryner v. Canyons Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 852, 855 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (“[T]he students in the video were clearly 
identifiable either by face, body shape, clothing or otherwise.”). 
 
33 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(A) (2006).  
 
34 Bryner v. Canyons Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 852, 855 (Utah Ct. App. 2015). The court did not say who had been 
responsible for administering or reviewing the video. See id. 
 
35 Id. at 858–59. 
 
36 Id. at 859. 
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concluded that the video could not be released to Bryner without the consent of the parents of the 
other students who were shown fighting in the video.37 Rather than ordering the school to get the 
consent of all parents whose children were in the video, the court ordered the district to blur the 
faces of other students in the video, and Bryner had to bear the cost of that redaction.38 
In Jacobson v. Ithaca City School District,39 a New York trial court held that two video 
recordings40 of a school’s guest speaker were not education records as defined by FERPA; 
therefore, the video recording had to be disclosed without parental consent to an attorney who 
requested access to the recordings under the state’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL).41 In 
this case, the school district had denied the attorney’s request for the video recordings and 
instead provided the attorney with a partial transcript of the video recordings.42 The school 
district determined the recordings were education records and refused to release them “on the 
basis that when they are in the custody of [the school district] they are maintained by an 
educational agency.”43 The court disagreed because the video recordings did not meet both 
prongs of the statutory definition of education records.44 Although the school was able to show 
                                                
37 Id. at 859–60 (“[W]hile Bryner has a right to ‘inspect and review’ the part of the Video relating to his child, he 
does not ‘have the right to inspect and review’ the portions of the Video in which other students are pictured.”). 
 
38 Id. at 859. 
 
39 53 Misc. 3d. 1091 (N.Y. Supp. Ct. 2016). 
 
40 Id. at 1093 (noting that the two video recordings of thee vent were made by a grandmother of one of the students 
who was not an employee of the school district.). 
 
41 Id. at 1097 (“FOIL expresses this State's strong commitment to open government and public accountability and 
imposes a broad standard of disclosure upon the State and its agencies. To this end, FOIL provides that all records of 
a public agency are presumptively open to public inspection and copying unless otherwise specifically exempted.”). 
 
42 Id. at 1093. 
 
43 Id. 
 
44 Id. (explaining that mere fact that information may be held by an educational agency is insufficient to make it an 
educational record.”) 
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that the district maintained the video, it was unable to show that the video “contain[ed] 
information directly related to a student.”45 While the court was sympathetic to the school 
district’s argument “that the visual and audio made it possible for a person in the community to 
identify students participating in the question and answer session,” the court still found that the 
video did not meet FERPA’s “directly related to a student” requirement because the video did 
not relate “in any way to the educational performance of the students depicted.”46 In particular, 
the court said the video had not been “maintained with, referenced in, or indexed to, any 
individual student files maintained by the central registrar or custodian of student records.”47 
Thus, the court ruled that the video was not an education record under FERPA.48 This court’s 
interpretation of what is considered an education record differs from Bryner v. Canyons School 
District, which said that FERPA is not limited to academic records.49 Additionally, the attorney 
who requested the video recordings consented to those videos being redacted to protect the 
identities of students involved.50 The court “determin[ed] that redaction [was] necessary and 
appropriate in this case, regardless of the applicability of FERPA, to protect the identities of the 
students involved in the event.”51 The court did not cite a law to support this determination. 
                                                
45 Jacobson v. Ithaca City Sch. Dist., 53 Misc. 3d. 1091, 1093 (N.Y. Supp. Ct. 2016). 
 
46 Jacobson, 53 Misc. 3d. at 1093–94. 
 
47 Id. at 1094. 
 
48 Id. (noting the school’s decision to share the partial transcript with the attorney “evince[d] an understanding that 
[the video] was not an educational record” under FERPA, for had it been considered an educational record, it would 
have been entirely exempt from disclosure under FOIL.” 
 
49 351 P.3d 852. (Utah Ct. App. 2015). The decision not to release the video in this case seems to align with the 
FPCO’s guidance that was shared with the NSBA).   
 
50 Id. 
 
51 Id. (explaining that the school district created this problem and must pay for the redactions: “It bears emphasizing 
that respondent created the possibility that video recordings depicting students would be published, not only by 
permitting the event to occur, but also by allowing individuals whom it did not employ . . .  to be present and record 
the event. The risk that unredacted video recordings depicting individual students would be published existed from 
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One court seemingly sidestepped the question of whether a videotape was an education 
record under FERPA in reaching its conclusion that the video could be disseminated to the 
public. In State v. Mart,52 a video of students fighting on a school bus was used as evidence in 
the criminal prosecution of one of the students involved in the incident.53 The school district and 
a trial court denied the release of the video to a local newspaper and a local news station, and 
both news organizations appealed.54 They argued that the video must be released because it is a 
public record under Louisiana’s public records law. Louisiana’s public record law defines a 
public record to include: 
All . . . tapes, recordings . . . having been used, being in use, or prepared, 
possessed, or retained for use in the conduct, transaction, or performance of any 
business, transaction, work, duty, or function which was conducted, transacted, or 
performed by or under the authority of the constitution or laws of this state.55 
 
The court said: “Given this broad definition, it can hardly be disputed that the evidence tape 
constitutes a public record. It is a reproduction of a tape prepared for use by a parish school 
system during the court of its duty to provide public transportation to students.”56 The school 
argued that even if the court found the evidence video to be a public record under Louisiana’s 
public records law, withholding of this public record is justified.57 The district attorney argued, 
                                                                                                                                                       
the moment that the recordings were made by individuals not under [the school district’s] control and, in fact, 
portions of the video recordings have apparently been published and made available for public viewing. Thus, 
disclosure of video recordings redacted as directed herein causes no further harm to any of the innocent students 
involved.”) 
 
52 State v. Mart, 697 So. 2d 1055 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997). 
 
53 Id. 
 
54 Id. at 1058. 
 
55 Id. 
 
56 Id. at 1059. 
 
57 Id. 
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“[F]ederal law prevents dissemination of the tape to the general public because it is a 
confidential educational record.” The court did not consider whether the video was directly 
related to students and maintained by the school.58 Instead, the court said, “Contrary to the 
District Attorney's assertion, the Buckley Amendment does not preclude the release of 
information pertaining to students to the public; rather, it acts to control the careless release of 
educational information by educational institutions by threatening to withhold federal funds for 
doing so.”59 The court, therefore, concluded that Louisiana’s public access law mandates that the 
evidence be released to the public.60  The Mart court’s decision to forego the two-prong 
education record test seems to oversimplify the goal of FERPA. According to Senator James 
Buckley who proposed FERPA and spoke about it a congressional hearing, FERPA was enacted 
“to protect the rights of students and their parents and to prevent the abuse of personal files and 
data in the area of federally assisted educational activities.”61 Controlling the careless release of 
educational information is one aspect of that protection. 
School Official Access 
School officials can access school surveillance videos that are considered education 
records under FERPA. School officials are the exception to the rule that prohibits schools from 
disclosing a student’s education record that contains his or her personally identifiable 
information without parental consent.62 Teachers, administrators, and others who directly work 
                                                
58 State v. Mart, 697 So. 2d 1055, 1059 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997). 
 
59 Id. at 1060. 
 
60 Id. 
 
61 120 Congr. Rec., 1974. 
 
62 20 U.S.C. 1232g(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
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for the school are school officials within the meaning of FERPA.63 Furthermore, in 2008, the 
Department of Education expanded the term “school officials” to include consultants, volunteers, 
and other parties who provide services that the educational agency would otherwise use its 
employees to perform.64 These school officials can review students’ education records, including 
school surveillance videos, when they have a “legitimate educational interest” in doing so.65 It is 
the school's responsibility to set out a written standard for determining when there is a legitimate 
educational reason for inspecting education records, according to FERPA regulations.66 The 
FPCO indicated on its website that “[g]enerally, a school official has a legitimate educational 
interest if the official needs to review an education record in order to fulfill his or her 
professional responsibility.”67  
Only one court held that an individual could obtain access to an education-record school 
surveillance video under the school official exception to FERPA’s parental consent requirement. 
In Medley v. Board of Education of Shelby County,68 the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that 
videotapes of a teacher's classroom were education records under FERPA.69 The court also held 
that the videos had to be disclosed to the teacher because she was a school official under 
                                                
63 Id. 
 
64 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1). 
 
65 20 U.S.C. 1232g(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 
66 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1) (requiring that the school make the determination as to what constitutes “legitimate 
educational interests”). 
 
67 FERPA FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS - FERPA FOR SCHOOL OFFICIALS, FAMILY POLICY COMPLIANCE OFFICE, 
http://familypolicy.ed.gov/faq-page/ferpa-school-officials#t69n90 (last visited Apr. 12, 2017).  
 
68 168 S.W.3d 398 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004). 
 
69 Id. at 404. 
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FERPA.70 In this case, Debbie Medley, a special education teacher, made an open records 
request to view video recordings of her own classroom.71 The cameras were installed in her 
classroom to monitor her performance after students in her classroom complained that she had 
treated them inappropriately.72 Medley said she would like to view the videos “to evaluate [her] 
performance, as a teacher, as well as the management of [her] classroom.”73 In this case, all 
parties agreed the video was an education record under FERPA.74 On that basis, the school 
district and then later the state attorney general denied the teacher’s request, claiming that 
FERPA prohibited the release of the videotapes to the teacher.75 The Kentucky Court of Appeals, 
however, said the school district and the state attorney general failed to take the school official 
exception into consideration when they reviewed the teacher’s request.76 According to the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals, the school official exception applies to “teachers within the 
educational institution . . . who have been determined by such agency or institution to have 
legitimate educational interests, including the educational interests of the child for whom consent 
would otherwise be required.”77 Thus, the court found that the teacher’s request should not have 
been considered as having been made by “a member of the public.”78 Rather, the teacher’s 
                                                
70 Id. 
 
71 Id. at 401. 
 
72 Id.   
 
73 Id. 
 
74 Medley v. Board of Education of Shelby County, 168 S.W.3d 398, 402 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004). 
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request should have been judged in light of her position as a teacher.79 The Kentucky Court of 
Appeals then reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court for a hearing on the issue of 
whether the teacher had an educational interest in viewing the video.80  
A school can choose to designate school resource officers (SROs) as school officials. 81  
In fact, in 2008, the FPCO recommended that schools designate members of their “law 
enforcement unit,”82 which typically includes school resource officers, as school officials with a 
legitimate educational interest so they can have access to students’ education records without 
parental permission.83 According to the FPCO, such access enables SROs to “perform their 
professional duties and assist with school safety matters.”84 According to FERPA regulations, 
SROs will be considered “school officials” with “legitimate educational interests,” only if they:  
                                                
79 Id.  
 
80 Medley v. Board of Education of Shelby County, 168 S.W.3d 398, 404 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that 
because the trial court record was void of any discussion of Medley’s educational interest in the videotapes, other 
than the statement made in her initial request that the videotapes would be beneficial to improving her teaching 
performance and help her manage  her class, the court reversed and remanded for a hearing on the issue of whether 
Medley had an educational interest in the video). The status of this case was not available on Westlaw. 
 
81 School resource officers are on-site law enforcement. Education Under Arrest: The Case Against Police in 
Schools, JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE (Nov. 2011),  
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/educationunderarrest_fullreport.pdf (“Not all police 
are SROs, but all SROs are police . . . . SROs are typically accountable first to the police department and then to the 
school, which might pay part of an SRO’s salary or administrative cost.”). 
 
82  Under FERPA, a “law enforcement unit” is “an individual or a division of an educational agency that is officially 
authorized by that agency to (1) enforce any local, State, or Federal law or (2) maintain the physical security and 
safety of the agency or institution.” 34 C.F.R. § 99.8. 
83 Balancing Student Privacy and School Safety: A Guide to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act for 
Elementary and Secondary Schools, FAMILY POLICY COMPLIANCE OFFICE (Oct. 2007) [hereinafter Balancing 
Student Privacy], https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/brochures/elsec.pdf (“Many school districts employ 
security staff to monitor safety and security in and around schools. Some schools employ off-duty police officers as 
school security officers, while others designate a particular school official to be responsible for referring potential or 
alleged violations of law to local police authorities. Under FERPA, investigative reports and other records created 
and maintained by these law enforcement units are not considered education records subject to FERPA.”). See 
discussion infra Part II. 
 
84 When can law enforcement unit officials serve as “school officials”?, FERPA Frequently Asked Questions, 
FAMILY POLICY COMPLIANCE OFFICE, http://familypolicy.ed.gov/content/when-can-law-enforcement-unit-officials-
serve-“school-officials” (last visited Apr. 12, 2017). 
 
 79 
Perform[] an institutional service or function for which the agency or institution 
would otherwise use employees; [Are] under the direct control of the agency or 
institution with respect to the use and maintenance of education records; [Are] 
subject to the requirements . . . that [a student’s] personally identifiable 
information from an education record [may be used] only for the purposes for 
which the disclosure was made.85  
 
SROs designated as school officials can access and share student education records 
within the school, but cannot share those records with the local police department, unless 
another exception applies.86 
While courts have yet to rule on SRO access to school surveillance videos, one court 
documented a disagreement between a school district and its director of security on this issue. In 
Merrill v. Winston-Salem Forsyth County Board of Education,87 the court held that a school 
employee was properly dismissed despite his claim that his discharge from employment violated 
his right to free expression under the North Carolina Constitution.88 In this case, Patrick Merrill, 
the school’s director of security, said he was fired for advocating for SROs to get access to 
school surveillance videos without first getting approval from the school district’s legal team.89 
An incident on a school bus that led an SRO to request school surveillance videos from school 
administrators sparked the controversy.90 Instead of immediately handing over the video, the 
assistant principal checked with one of the school district’s staff attorneys who said the SRO 
needed a subpoena to obtain the video because the video contained confidential information 
                                                
85 34 CFR § 99.31. 
 
86 When can law enforcement unit officials serve as “school officials”?, FERPA Frequently Asked Questions, 
FAMILY POLICY COMPLIANCE OFFICE, http://familypolicy.ed.gov/content/when-can-law-enforcement-unit-officials-
serve-“school-officials” (last visited Apr. 12, 2017). 
 
87  791 S.E.2d 2016 WL 6080858 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).  
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89 Id. This approval system/procedure was written into the SROs’ contracts with the school district. Id. 
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protected by FERPA.91 In response, Merrill emailed the school district attorneys about their 
“mistakenly [sic] legal advice” and said, “[W]e allow law enforcement access to our cameras.”92 
When the attorneys’ decision did not change, Merrill reached out to a law professor for the law 
professor’s opinion on the matter.93 The law professor provided Merrill with a memo supporting 
his interpretation of FERPA and stating that, in his opinion, the school attorneys “had not kept up 
with current FERPA law.”94 Merrill forwarded this information to the school attorneys.95 Within 
a month, Merrill was terminated for his “attempt to undermine the legal advice of [the school] 
district's Chief Legal Counsel.”96 The court ultimately held Merrill’s right to free expression was 
not violated because the speech at issue dealt with his own employment and not a matter of 
public concern.97 While freedom of expression and discharge from employment were the legal 
issues before the court, the court’s lengthy discussion of a dispute over SRO access to school 
surveillance footage shows that this is an area of law in which additional guidance from the 
FPCO could be beneficial. The court did not say anything about how the SRO access issue 
should have been resolved.  
Emergency Access  
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93 791 S.E.2d 2016 WL 6080858 , at *2 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016). 
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FERPA permits school officials to disclose school surveillance videos that are education 
records to appropriate parties in emergency situations.98 In order for this exception to apply, there 
has to be knowledge that confidential information is necessary to protect the health or safety of 
the student or other individuals.99 According to FPCO guidance, “Disclosures made under the 
health or safety emergency provision must be related to an actual, impending, or imminent 
emergency, such as a natural disaster, a terrorist attack, a campus shooting, or the outbreak of an 
epidemic disease.”100 For example, if a school official can explain why, based on all the 
information then available, the official reasonably believes that a student poses a significant 
threat of substantial bodily harm to any person, the school official may disclose personally 
identifiable information from education records without consent “to any person whose 
knowledge of the information will assist in protecting a person from threat.”101 While the 
Department of Education defers to school administrators and requires only a rational basis for the 
educational institution’s decision, FPCO guidance does make it clear that disclosures should not 
be made simply to prepare for an emergency when the likelihood of an emergency is 
unknown.102 Courts have yet to decide a case in which the issue was whether a school 
surveillance video should be released under the emergency exception.  
Persons Designated in a Lawfully Issued Subpoena or Judicial Order  
 
                                                
98 See 34 CFR §§ 99.31(a)(10) and 99.36. 
 
99 Id. 
 
100 Id. 
 
101 Family Policy Compliance, Office U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Addressing Emergencies on Campus (June 2011), 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/pdf/emergency-guidance.pdf. 
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FERPA permits schools to disclose students’ education records to the entity or person 
designated in a lawfully issued subpoena or court order.103 Typically, this provision requires 
schools to make a reasonable effort to notify the student whose records are being subpoenaed 
before complying with the subpoena or court order.104 Parents have an opportunity to challenge 
them.105 This notice requirement may be skipped in cases where the issuing court or agency 
deems that it is necessary.106 Furthermore, a school can be ordered by a court not to disclose to 
anyone the existence or contents of the subpoena or judicial order.107  
There has been one case in which disclosure of school surveillance turned on a court 
order. In Goldberg v. Regional School District #18,108 the Superior Court of Connecticut held 
school bus surveillance videos were education records under FERPA, but that the videos could 
be disclosed to the parents because the videos were material and necessary to aid the resolution 
of a related criminal case.109 Jean and James Goldberg, the parents of a student diagnosed with 
autism, requested videotapes from the school district when they heard their child was being 
                                                
103 See § 99.31(a)(9)(i) and (ii). 
 
104 34 CFR § 99.31(a)(9).  
 
105 Id. 
 
106 Id. 
 
107 Id.; FERPA FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, FAMILY POLICY COMPLIANCE OFFICE, 
http://familypolicy.ed.gov/content/may-schools-comply-subpoena-or-court-order-education-records-without-
consent-parent-or (“For example, when a parent is a party to a court proceeding involving child abuse and neglect or 
dependency matters, and the order is issued in the context of that proceeding, additional notice to the parent by the 
educational agency or institution is not required, the school does not have to notify the parent.”) (last visited Apr. 12, 
2017).  
 
108 Goldberg v. Reg'l Sch. Dist. No. 18, No. KNLCV146020037S, 2015 WL 4571079, at *2–3 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
June 26, 2015). 
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bullied on the bus.110 The school district denied the parents’ request to view the video because it 
determined the video was an education record for the student bullies as well as the bullied 
child.111 The Goldbergs then filed a petition for a bill of discovery for the videotapes.112 The 
Superior Court of Connecticut agreed that FERPA prohibited education records that contain 
personally identifiable information from being released without parental consent.113 However, 
the court observed that FERPA allows the release of information without parental consent when 
“such information is furnished in compliance with judicial order. . .  upon condition that parents 
and the students are notified . . . in advance of the compliance therewith by the educational 
institution.”114 When deciding on a judicial order for education records, the court explained, 
“[c]ourts must balance all the facts and interests in favor of and in opposition to disclosure of 
education records within the meaning of FERPA.”115 In this case, Connecticut Superior Court 
found that the parents had a “good faith basis” for requesting access to the school surveillance 
                                                
110 Id. at *2. The parents were told by more than one person that two students who rode the bus “forcibly pushed 
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114 Goldberg v. Reg'l Sch. Dist. No. 18, No. KNLCV146020037S, 2015 WL 4571079, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 
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videos.116 The court said, “[T]he videos are actually material and necessary because the videos 
are objective evidence of what did and did not take place within the camera's view and because 
[the child] cannot be expected to articulate what happened to him, let alone testify about it, in the 
foreseeable future.”117 Thus, the court ordered the school district to provide the tapes to the 
parents of the student victim and to notify the parents of the other students on the tape of the 
court-ordered disclosure.118 
School Surveillance Videos that are not Education Records under FERPA  
 
FERPA exempts several categories of student information from its broad definition of 
education records. 119  Under FERPA, education records do not include: (a) records kept in the 
sole possession of the maker,120 (b) records created and maintained by a law enforcement unit,121 
(c) records relating to an individual who is employed by a school that are made and maintained 
in the normal course of business,122 and (d) records on a student who is eighteen years of age or 
older which are made or maintained by a health care professional who is treating the student.123 
FERPA regulations state that records about an individual who is no longer a student are exempt 
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117 Id.  
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119 See id.; 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(4)(B) (explaining that these records are not “education records”).  
120 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (stating that these are “[r]ecords that are kept in the sole possession of the maker, [] used only as 
a personal memory aid, and not accessible or revealed to any other person except a temporary substitute for the 
maker or the record.” ). A school official’s notes regarding a telephone conversation or face-to-face conversation 
with a parent would be an example. FERPA FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, FAMILY POLICY COMPLIANCE OFFICE, 
http://familypolicy.ed.gov/faq-page (last visited Apr. 12, 2017). 
 
121 34 C.F.R. § 99.3; see infra  pp. 18–10. 
 
122 34 C.F.R. § 99.3; see Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Mattox, 830 F.2d 576, 579 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that a 
teacher’s college transcript was not a record under FERPA). 
 
123 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (excluding as remedial or other activities that are part of the school’s instructional program).  
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as well.124 When a record is not an education record under FERPA, it can be released without 
parent consent to specific parties delineated in the statute. To date, the FPCO and courts have 
considered only the issue of whether a school surveillance video can be released under the law 
enforcement exemption, not the other three exemptions.   
Anyone can access school surveillance videos if those videos are law enforcement 
records and not education records under FERPA.125 In 1992, FERPA was amended to exempt 
“law enforcement records” from the definition of "education records."126 FERPA regulations 
explain that law enforcement records are “those records, files, documents, and other materials 
that are: (1) created by a law enforcement unit; (2) created for a law enforcement purpose; and 
(3) maintained by the law enforcement unit.”127 A “law enforcement unit” is defined as “an 
individual or a division of an educational agency that is officially authorized by that agency to 
(1) enforce any local, State, or Federal law or (2) maintain the physical security and safety of the 
agency or institution.”128 If the law enforcement unit also performs non-law enforcement 
functions for the school, including the investigation of incidents or conduct that leads to a 
disciplinary proceeding against a student, the law enforcement unit does not lose its status.129 
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125 See Addressing Emergencies on Campus, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC. (June 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/ 
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When Congress amended FERPA to distinguish law enforcement records from education 
records, it had colleges and universities in mind because they have police departments.130 Before 
the 1992 amendments, FERPA prohibited campus law enforcement records from being disclosed 
to the public.131 As a result, schools were sometimes forced to choose between noncompliance 
with state public record laws and noncompliance with FERPA.132 This conflict was discussed in 
detail at a 1992 congressional hearing.133 Speakers at the hearing emphasized that 
noncompliance with FERPA potentially jeopardizes an institution's federal funding whereas 
complying with FERPA placed colleges and universities in the “unfortunate position of 
appearing to use [FERPA] to cover up campus crime.”134 It was a lose-lose situation. Congress 
therefore amended FERPA to exempt from its definition of education records “any records 
maintained by a law enforcement unit of the educational agency or institution that were created 
by such law enforcement unit for the purpose of law enforcement.”135  
In 2007, FPCO issued informal guidance on school surveillance videos maintained by 
law enforcement units that said: “Images of students captured on security videotapes that are 
maintained by the school's law enforcement unit are not considered education records under 
                                                
130 Comm. On Labor & Human Res., U.S. Senate, REP. On Reauthorizing the Higher Educ. Act of 1965 (Nov. 12, 
1991), https://archive.org/stream/ERIC_ED340276/ERIC_ED340276_djvu.txt.  
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132 Id. This is not always the case. For example, North Carolina public records law says that records are public 
unless there is an exception in the law. FERPA is one such exception, so there is no conflict between the two laws. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132. 
 
133 Comm. On Labor & Human Res., U.S. Senate, REP. On Reauthorizing the Higher Educ. Act of 1965 (Nov. 12, 
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FERPA.”136 One would assume that means those records would be public unless some other law 
forbade disclosure. However, the FPCO said “these videotapes may be shared with parents of 
students whose images are on the video and with outside law enforcement authorities, as 
appropriate.” 137 This appears to be another instance of confusing guidance by the FPCO. The 
FPCO also recommends that schools  designate a law enforcement unit (if they do not have one) 
“to maintain school security camera[s] and determine the appropriate circumstances in which the 
school would disclose recorded images.”138 This is interesting because there is nothing 
prohibiting a school from releasing school surveillance videos if they are not considered 
education records under FERPA.  
Two courts have considered whether a school surveillance video was a law enforcement 
record. In one case, a student requested access and, in the other case, a parent requested access. 
The courts ruled that the school surveillance videos could be released in both cases because the 
videos were law enforcement records, not education records under FERPA. In Rome City School 
District Disciplinary Hearing v. Grifasi,139 a New York trial court held that a school surveillance 
video of an altercation between students was not an education record under FERPA. Mark 
Grifasi Jr., a student who was suspended from school for his involvement in the fight, requested 
access to the school surveillance footage of the fight.140 The school denied the student’s request, 
citing FERPA’s prohibition against releasing education records without the consent of other 
                                                
136 Balancing Student Privacy, supra note 71. If the very same video was recorded by other school officials, courts 
would use the two-prong education record test to determine whether the video is an education record under FERPA 
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parents whose children were involved in the fight and caught on video.141 The court disagreed, 
finding the school video to be a law enforcement record that could be released, not an education 
record.142 According to the court: 
[E]ducation records are defined as records, files, documents and other material 
which contain information directly related to a student and such education 
records do not include records maintained by a law enforcement unit of the 
educational agency or institution that were created by that law enforcement unit 
for the purpose of law enforcement.143 
 
The court found the purpose of the school surveillance in this case was to help maintain the 
physical security and safety of the school building.144 The court therefore concluded that the 
videotape was not an education record under FERPA because it did not pertain to the educational 
performance of the students captured on the tape.145 Because the video was deemed a law 
enforcement record rather than an education record under FERPA, Grifasi was able to view the 
video without the consent of other parents and without redactions. 
In Bryner v. Canyons School District,146 the Utah Court of Appeals also held that the 
video of a student who was caught fighting on school surveillance cameras was not an education 
record as defined by FERPA. In this case, the Utah Headliners Chapter of the Society of 
Professional Journalists filed an amicus brief arguing that the surveillance video was not an 
education record because it was “akin to a law enforcement record,”147 not an education 
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record.148 The court determined that Bryner failed to show the video was a law enforcement 
record.149 The court said, “Even assuming the Video was created for a law enforcement purpose, 
i.e., security, ‘[r]ecords created ... for a law enforcement purpose that are maintained by a 
component of the educational agency or institution other than the law enforcement unit’ are not 
law enforcement records.”150 In other words, the court found the video at issue was not a law 
enforcement record because the school, not the law enforcement unit, maintained it. 
School Surveillance Videos under State Privacy and Access Laws 
 
Ten states expressly recognize a right to privacy in their constitutions, 151 but courts have 
yet to find that a state constitution prohibits school surveillance videos from being disclosed. 
Three courts ruled that school surveillance videos had to be released under state public record 
laws despite state student privacy laws. Two courts prohibited the disclosure of a video that 
would have been disclosed under FERPA.  
State Constitutions 
 
One court has discussed whether a state’s constitution limits the disclosure of a school 
surveillance video. In State v. Mart,152 the court held that a school surveillance video of students 
fighting on a bus had to be disclosed despite the school district’s argument that students had a 
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151 Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 3, 2015), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-protections-in-state-
constitutions.aspx (“Constitutions in 10 states—Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Montana, South Carolina and Washington—have explicit provisions relating to a right to privacy.”). 
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protected privacy interest in the videotape under the Louisiana constitution.153 In this case, a 
local television station and a local newspaper requested access to a school bus surveillance video 
under Louisiana’s Public Records Law.154 The law favors disclosure.155 However, the school 
district argued that the privacy interests of the students depicted in the videotape outweighed the 
public's access rights.156 The court set forth the following test to determine if withholding the 
video was justified:  
First, the custodian or individual claiming the privacy right must prove that there 
is a reasonable expectation of privacy against disclosure of the information to a 
person entitled to access to the public information. If, and only if, a reasonable 
expectation of privacy against disclosure is found, a court must weigh or balance 
the public records disclosure interest against the privacy interest.157 
 
The Mart court considered whether the students had a reasonable expectation of privacy under 
the Louisiana constitution.158 Under the Louisiana constitution, the court said, a reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists when an individual has a subjective expectation of privacy that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.159 The school district argued the students had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy that their reactions to the fight would not be shared with the 
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public.160 The school district also argued that that expectation was objectively reasonable 
because FERPA has recognized that students have a privacy interest in their education records.161 
The court found the students had no subjective expectation of privacy because they were riding 
on a public school bus, their actions were visible to all those around them, and they knew they 
were being recorded.162 The court found the students had no objective expectation of privacy 
because the court said FERPA was enacted to “control the careless release of educational 
information by education institutions . . .  [not] to grant individual students the right of 
privacy.”163 Because no reasonable expectation of privacy against disclosure was found, the 
court’s analysis stopped here. There was no privacy right to weigh against the disclosure.  
State Student Privacy Laws 
Forty-nine states have student privacy laws,164 and some of them offer greater student 
privacy protections than FERPA does.165 There are four court cases in which disclosure of school 
                                                
160 Id. at 1059. 
 
161 Id. 
 
162 Id. at 1060. 
 
163 Id. (citing  Red & Black Publishing Co., Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, 262 Ga. 848, 427 S.E.2d 257, 261 
(Ga.1993); Student Bar Association Board of Governors, School of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill v. Byrd, 293 N.C. 594, 239 S.E.2d 415, 419 (N.C.1977).  
 
164 See, e.g., Ala. Educ. Code 16-44B-1; Alaska Admin. Code. tit. 4 § 07.060(a); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-1042(J); 
Ark. Code. Ann. § 6-18-109: Cal. Educ. Code § 49076(a), 49077; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-1-123(1); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 
10-10a; 14 Del. Admin. Code § 294; D.C. Code Ann. § 38-355; Fla. Stat. § 1002.22; Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-660 – 
20-2-668; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 302D-23; Idaho Code Ann. § 33-133; 105 ILCS 10/1-10; Ind. Code § 20-33-7-1; Iowa 
Code § 22.7; Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 72-6215 – 72- 6223; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 160.700 – 160.730; La. Revised Statute 
§ 17-3914; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 20-A, § 951; Md. Code. Ann. Educ. §§ 4-131; Mass Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 34D; Mich. 
Comp. Laws § 388.1601; Minn. Stat. § 13.32; Miss. Code Ann. §§ 37- 15-1; Mo. Rev. Stat. §161.096; Montana 
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165  For example, Illinois allows for a private right of action if a school or school district violates a student’s privacy 
rights and FERPA does not. See 105 ILCS 10/1. 
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surveillance video turned on whether a state student privacy law limited the disclosure of the 
video under the state’s open record law, and in two of those cases students’ video records were 
prohibited from being disclosed. 
In WFTV, Inc. v. School Board of Seminole,166 Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal 
held that the state’s student privacy law prohibited the disclosure of the school bus surveillance 
video, even if the personally identifying information was redacted. In this case, a broadcast 
television station sued the school board seeking disclosure of a redacted school bus surveillance 
video under the section of the Florida constitution that guarantees public access to government 
records.167 The school district denied the television station’s request, arguing that the video was a 
confidential record under the state student privacy statute that is similar to FERPA.168 While 
WFTV agreed that the school surveillance video falls under the category of  “records and 
reports” protected by the state student privacy statute, it did not agree that the entire surveillance 
video was exempt from disclosure.169 WFTV argued that the school board was required to redact 
the personally identifiable information from the surveillance video “pursuant to [the Florida 
constitution] and provide public access to the redacted documents.”170 Florida’s Second District 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
166 WFTV, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole, 874 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 
167 Id. at 50. The Florida constitution states: “Every person has the right to inspect or copy any public record made or 
received in connection with the official business of any public body, officer, or employee of the state, or persons 
acting on their behalf, except with respect to records exempted pursuant to this section or specifically made 
confidential by this Constitution.” Fla. Const. art. I, § 24. 
 
168 Id. The Florida law said: “Every pupil or student shall have a right of privacy with respect to the educational 
records kept on him or her. Personally identifiable records or reports of a pupil or student, and any personal 
information contained therein, are confidential and exempt from the provisions of [the Florida constitution]. No 
[public school] . . . shall permit the release of such records, report or information without the written consent of the 
pupil's or student's parent or guardian, or of the pupil or student himself or herself if he or she [is over 18], to any 
individual, agency, or organization.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 228.093 (West). 
 
169 WFTV, 874 So. 2d at 55. 
 
170 Id. at 52. 
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Court of Appeal reviewed Florida’s student privacy law and determined that the television 
station was incorrect in assuming it could receive a redacted version of the video.171 According 
to the court, Florida’s student privacy statute allows only students to request and receive the 
partial release of information contained in their confidential records and reports.172 
 In that same case, the District Court of Appeal of Florida refused WFTV’s request for 
the court to construe the section of Florida’s student privacy laws pertaining to personal 
information in harmony with FERPA.173 The court said it declined to do so because FERPA has 
been interpreted to protect only personally identifiable information.174 According to the court, 
“The State of Florida goes beyond the funding conditions specified in FERPA and protects the 
privacy of its students in its educational institutions by preventing the release of ‘any personal 
information’ contained in records or reports which permit the personal identification of a 
student.”175 Thus, the court determined that Florida’s student privacy law protects even redacted 
versions of confidential records and reports because  “personal information” under the state law 
is more encompassing than “personally identifiable information” under FERPA.176 As a result, 
the District Court of Appeal of Florida held that the school board could not disclose the records 
to the television station, even if the personally identifying information was redacted.177 
                                                
171 Id. at 55. 
 
172 WFTV, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole, 874 So. 2d 48, 55(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 
173 Id. at 58. 
 
174 Id. 
 
175 WFTV, 874 So. 2d at 59 (quoting Florida’s student privacy law) (explaining that personally identifiable records 
or reports of a pupil or student, and any personal information contained therein, are confidential and exempt from 
the provisions of [Florida’s student privacy law]. 
 
176 Id. 
 
177 Id. 
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In Tampa Television, Inc. v. School Board of Hillsborough County,178 the Florida District 
Court of Appeals denied a local television station access to a school bus surveillance video of a 
student who pulled out a gun on the bus because the video was considered a “student record” or 
“report” under Florida’s student privacy law.179 Under Florida’s student privacy law, student 
records and reports “mean any and all official records, files, and data directly related to pupils 
and students which are created, maintained, and used by public educational institutions.”180 The 
law goes on to provide a laundry list of examples of “[m]aterials which shall be considered as a 
part of a pupil’s or a student’s record,” including “verified reports of serious or recurrent 
behavior patterns; and any other evidence, knowledge, or information recorded in any medium, 
including . . .  film.”181 The court determined that the video fit into the category of “student 
records and reports” because it “could be used to produce verified reports of serious or recurrent 
behavior patterns.”182 
In Medley v. Board of Education of Shelby County,183 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky 
held that the Kentucky Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (KFERPA), a statute similar 
to FERPA, prohibited a school from releasing records to the public but not to teachers. In this 
case, a special education teacher requested to see videotapes of her classroom so she could use 
them to evaluate and improve her teaching performance.184 The school district and attorney 
                                                
178 659 So. 2d 331 (Fla. App. 1995) (Parker, J., concurring).  
 
179 Id. at 331. 
 
180 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 228.093(2)(e)(West). 
 
181 Id. 
 
182 Tampa Televisions, 659 So. at 331. 
 
183 168 S.W.3d 398, 404 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004). 
 
184 Id. at 401. 
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general said KFERPA prohibited the requested disclosure.185 The Kentucky Court of Appeals 
said that the school district and the attorney general failed to consider the fact that the teacher 
was entitled to see the videos because KFPERA said, “Educational institutions shall not permit 
the release or disclosure of records, reports, or identifiable information on students to third 
parties ... without parental or eligible student consent except to:(a) Other school officials, 
including teachers, with legitimate education interests and purposes.”186 The court further 
explained that the teacher’s request to see the video should have been granted if she had a 
legitimate educational interest and purpose in viewing the video.187 Because that issue was not 
considered at the trial court, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a hearing 
on the issue of whether Medley had a legitimate educational interest and purpose.188 If the court 
finds her interest to indeed be legitimate, the teacher must be afforded the opportunity to view 
the videotapes.189 
In Lindeman v. Kelso Sch. Dist. No. 458,190 the Supreme Court of Washington held that a 
state student privacy law did not prohibit the release of a school bus surveillance video to the 
parents of one student involved in a fight. Therefore, the surveillance video had to be disclosed 
under Washington’s public records law.191 In this case, the parents of an elementary school 
student who was involved in a fight on a school bus filed suit under the state’s public records law 
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186 Id. at 403. 
 
187 Id. at 405. 
 
188 Id. 
 
189  Medley v. Bd. of Educ. of Shelby Cnty., 168 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004). 
 
190 Lindeman v. Kelso Sch. Dist. No. 458, 172 P.3d 329 (Wash. 2007). 
 
191 Id. at 330. 
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to require the school district to produce a redacted version of the video.192 Washington’s public 
records law requires state and local agencies to disclose all public records upon request, unless 
the record falls within a specific statutory exemption.193 An agency withholding public records 
bears the burden of proving the applicability of an exemption.194 The school district refused the 
parents’ disclosure request under the student file exemption in the state student privacy law.195 
The state student privacy law exempts from disclosure “[p]ersonal information in any files 
maintained for students in public schools, patients or clients of public institutions or public 
health agencies, or welfare recipients.”196 The court found the surveillance video did not fit 
within this student file exemption because “[t]he videotape from the surveillance camera differs 
significantly from the type of record that schools maintain in students' personal files.” According 
to the court, “[t]he student file exemption contemplates the protection of material in a public 
school student's permanent file, such as a student's grades, standardized test results, assessments, 
psychological or physical evaluations, class schedule, address, telephone number, social security 
number, and other similar records,” and not maintaining the safety and security of students on 
school buses.197 Thus, the court held the security videotape was not legally withheld as a student 
file document under the state’s student privacy law.198 
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193 Id. 
 
194 Id. at 331. 
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196 Lindeman v. Kelso Sch. Dist. No. 458, 172 P.3d 329, 333 (Wash. 2007). 
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Conclusions 
School surveillance videos that are determined to be education records under FERPA are 
unlikely to be disclosed to the general public. Education records are records that are directly 
related to the student and maintained by the school. If the court determines a video is an 
education record, it then considers whether the video contains personally identifiable student 
information that would prohibit the unredacted video from being shared without parental consent 
or the consent of students who are 18 and older.  
 School surveillance videos that meet a FERPA exception may only be disclosed to 
appropriate parties under certain circumstances. School officials such as school administrators 
and teachers can access education-record school surveillance videos if they have a legitimate 
educational interest. Police and health care professionals can access education-record school 
surveillance videos in emergency situations. The media and others can access education-records 
school surveillance videos with a court order. Determining whether a person can access school 
surveillance videos under these categories is pretty straightforward because access rights are 
clearly spelled out in the federal statute.  
 School surveillance videos that fall under a FERPA exemption are the least protected 
because they are not education records.  For example, a school surveillance video that is 
maintained by a law enforcement unit for a law enforcement purpose can be accessed and used 
by police without restriction. Law enforcement records are also less protective of students’ 
privacy because they can be released to the public without parental consent. Courts have yet to 
consider whether school surveillance videos fit into other FERPA exemption categories.  
 Finally, forty-nine states have student privacy laws, and some of them offer more privacy 
protection for students than FERPA does. For example, in WFTV, Inc. v. School Board of 
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Seminole, news organizations were unable to obtain access to redacted versions of a school 
surveillance video because Florida’s student privacy law prevents the release of any personal 
information in a student’s record, not just the personally identifiable information that is protected 
by FERPA. This means that in Florida information that pertains to students is protected even if it 
does not identify them. On the other hand, the state student privacy law applied in Medley v. 
Board of Education of Shelby County is very similar to FERPA. This case discussed whether 
school officials should have access to a student education records, one of the same issues that 
courts have grappled with under federal law.   
 Scholars have been trying to make sense of the varying and conflicting FPCO guidance 
and court decisions regarding the disclosure of school surveillance videos for the past twenty 
years. The FPCO has not issued an informal response on the subject since 2008. As a result, 
there is a lot of guesswork left to school districts. Given that all districts cited FERPA (or similar 
state privacy laws) in response to record requests, it appears that school districts err on the side 
of not releasing records. While this may seem like a good thing from a student privacy 
standpoint, it has produced a few odd results. Consider the number of claims brought by parents 
to access school surveillance videos of their own children. FERPA was enacted to give parents 
greater access and control over their children’s records, but schools have tried to block that 
access citing FERPA. In one case, a parent was allowed to access a school surveillance video 
only because courts ruled it was not considered an education records under FERPA. In another 
case, a parent could not access a school surveillance video without bearing the cost of redactions. 
More clarification on the subject of school surveillance is needed so access to school surveillance 
records will be fair and consistent.  
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CHAPTER 4: SUMMARY AND BEST PRACTICES 
 
 
Introduction 
Consider the following hypothetical: Two students are fighting in a public school 
hallway. Other students crowd around the fight. Some eventually get involved as peacemakers, 
and others encourage the fight to continue. School resource officers wearing body cameras 
record the altercation, and the school maintains the recordings. Based on school video 
surveillance case law, it is unlikely that any of the students who were filmed could successfully 
challenge the recording because courts would find students have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a public school hallway. Most federal and state privacy laws require a person to prove 
she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in order to have any chance of successfully claiming 
a legal right to privacy. 
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The question of who could get access to the videotape is not as straightforward. For the 
most part, whether the video could be disclosed to students, parents, school officials, law 
enforcement, or media depends on whether and for whom the video is considered an education 
record under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). Based on the U.S. 
Department of Education’s Family Policy Compliance Office’s most recent guidance, the video 
would be considered an education record for those students involved in the fight, and, 
potentially, for those who have witnessed the fight as well. This means that only parents of 
students in the video, students in the video who are eighteen and older, and school officials with 
a legitimate educational interest can view the video without parental consent. If the School 
Resource Officers have been designated as school officials by the school, they may view the 
video for internal purposes but may not share the video with outside law enforcement. Outside 
law enforcement and media would need parental consent to view the video unless an exception 
to FERPA applies.1 
School administrators, the FPCO, and courts have been wrestling with school video 
surveillance questions like the ones above for the past thirty years. Because of the increased use 
of body cameras in schools and cameras on buses, the need to address these issues is increasingly 
urgent. While courts have yet to address video surveillance of students in areas other than a 
school locker room under federal and state privacy laws, cases involving school employees’ 
privacy rights suggest that students probably have no right to challenge video surveillance in 
common areas on school grounds. Students’ rights to challenge surveillance may depend on their 
state’s eavesdropping law.  
                                                
1 For example, “FERPA [] allows the non-consensual disclosure of personally identifiable information from 
education records if the disclosure is to comply with a judicial order or lawfully issued subpoena,” including search 
warrant presented by police. Letter Re: Shelton State Community College, FERPA ONLINE LIBRARY (Feb. 28, 2007).  
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When it comes to access to school videos, new questions have arisen because of the 
increased police presence on public school campuses and the fact that the school-law 
enforcement relationships are not always clearly defined.2 For example, one school district in 
Virginia had a disagreement with its local police department because the school district “wants 
in-school sheriff's deputies, who've been wearing the cameras . . . to announce when they are 
recording, to blur the faces of students who are not directly involved in recorded incidents, and to 
provide the school with copies of the recordings,” but the county's sheriff refused because he did 
not want to have two sets of recording policies for his officers.3  
 This fourth and final chapter of this thesis summarizes the answers to the research 
questions posed in chapter one. This chapter concludes with a set of best practices for public 
schools that are considering adopting or increasing school video surveillance.  
What Legal Rights, if any, do Students have to be Free from Public School Video 
Surveillance? How do Courts Decide? 
 
Students and school employees have challenged school video surveillance under the 
Fourth Amendment, state constitutions, state tort law, state eavesdropping statutes, and school 
policies. An analysis of the relevant statutory and case law clearly demonstrates that students’ 
legal rights to be free from silent school video surveillance are very limited. Students can be 
recorded without their permission or their parents’ permission in most areas on a public school’s 
campus, but they cannot be recorded in areas in which they change clothes. Students may have 
                                                
2 Linnea Nelson et al., The Right to Remain a Student: How California School Policies Fail to Protect and Serve, 
ACLU-CA REPORT, Oct. 2016, https://www.aclusocal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/The-Right-to-Remain-a-
Student-ACLU-CA-Report.pdf (“School districts’ relationships with law enforcement fall into three general 
categories. First, some school districts hire and oversee their own law enforcement officers, who are employees of 
the school district. . . . They possess the same general powers as other sworn law enforcement officers in a state, 
including the power to question, detain, and arrest. Second, some school districts enter into agreements with county 
or municipal police departments to station law enforcement officers on or around school campuses rotating basis. 
Third, many school districts do not maintain a permanent police presence in their schools.”). 
3 Evie Blad, Body Cameras on School Police Spark Student Privacy Concerns, EDUCATION WEEK (Mar. 3, 2015), 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2015/03/04/body-cameras-on-school-police-spark-student.html. 
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an easier time challenging a school’s audio recording than a school silent recording of images. 
For example, a student could argue she has a reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations 
made in a teacher’s office under the Fourth Amendment, or she could argue she has a right to be 
free from being recorded without her consent under a state’s eavesdropping law, if that 
eavesdropping law requires consent from more than one party to record. 
Fourth Amendment 
Students have a right to be free from school video surveillance under the Fourth 
Amendment if they have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where they were 
recorded and if the recording is reasonable.4 Most school video surveillance cases turn on 
whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. A reasonable expectation of privacy exists 
when a person has an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.5  
The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test 
In 2008, in Brannum v. Overton County School Board, 6 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit recognized that students had a reasonable expectation of privacy in school locker 
rooms where they change clothes.1 According to the Sixth Circuit, “[S]tudents using locker 
rooms could reasonably expect that no one, especially the school administrators, would 
videotape them, without their knowledge, in various states of undress while they changed their 
clothes for an athletic activity.”7 John Doe (1-3) v. Dearborn Public School,8 a case involving 
                                                
4 U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.  
 
5 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 
6 516 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2008).  
 
7 Id. at 496. 
 
8 No. 06-CV-12369-DT, 2008 WL 896066 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2008). 
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school video surveillance of gym teachers in a locker room/office, further supports the principle 
that students have a reasonable expectation of privacy in areas where they change clothes. Like 
the Brannum court, the Dearborn court said that the gym teachers’ expectations of privacy were 
reasonable in an area where they changed from “street clothes to athletic clothes and to disrobe 
in order to shower after conducting physical education classes.”9  
Students may also have a reasonable expectation of privacy in school offices. In 
Chadwell v. Brewer,10 the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia found that a 
teacher had at least some expectation of privacy in his office. The court based its decision on the 
teacher’s exclusive use of the office, noting that the office itself was located at the end of a dead-
end hallway and was rarely used by anyone other than the teacher.11 Students obviously do not 
have offices, but they might be able to show that they have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
a teacher’s office by satisfying reasonable-expectation-of-privacy considerations discussed by 
courts in other cases such as John Doe (1-3) v. Dearborn Public School: 
[W]hether the human relationships that normally exist at the place inspected are 
based on intimacy, confidentiality, trust or solitude and hence give rise to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy . . . . [And] what the person wanted to protect 
his privacy from, for example, non-family members, non-employees of a firm, 
strangers passing by on the street or flying overhead in airplanes. This inquiry, 
therefore, focuses on the government intrusion at issue.12 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
9 Id. at *5. 
 
10 59 F. Supp. 3d 756, 765 (W.D. Va. 2014). 
 
11 Id. 
 
12 No. 06-CV-12369-DT, 2008 WL 896066 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2008). 
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A student who is having a confidential meeting with a teacher may be able to successfully argue 
that a school office is a place “based on . . . . confidentiality” that gives rise to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.13  
School employee cases suggest that students have no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
common areas on school grounds or a diminished expectation of privacy at most.14 Three courts 
have found that school employees have no reasonable expectation of privacy in a school 
classroom, one court found school employees have no reasonable expectation in a school break 
room, and one court found school employees enjoyed a diminished expectation of privacy on a 
school bus. In each of these cases, the court described these places as “accessible” or “public 
property, being operated for a public purpose.” This same reasoning could easily apply to school 
cafeterias, hallways, and parking lots. 
The Reasonableness Test  
If a court decides that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in an area, the 
court must then determine whether the video surveillance is reasonable.15 Determining the 
reasonableness of video surveillance conducted by school officials involves a twofold inquiry: 
(1) whether the search was justified at its inception, and (2) whether the search was permissible 
in its scope.16 It is not difficult to satisfy the justification prong of the reasonableness test. 
Schools typically argue safety and security reasons justify video surveillance, and, thus far, 
                                                
13 Id. at *5. 
 
14 School-employee video surveillance cases did not define a diminished expectation of privacy, but it seems to fall 
somewhere between the privacy expectations one might have in places retained for his or her exclusive use and 
public places in which one has no reasonable expectation of privacy. See State v. Duchow, 749 N.W.2d 913, 922 
(Wis. 2008). 
15 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 326 (1985); Brannum v. Overton Cty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 495 (6th Cir. 
2008) ( “[T]he ultimate measure of the constitutionality of [a search] is one of “reasonableness.”). 
 
16 Id. at 341. 
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courts have always accepted schools’ safety and security arguments.17 For example, in Brannum 
v. Overton County School Board,18 the one case in which students challenged school video 
surveillance of their school locker room under the Fourth Amendment, the Sixth Circuit said 
installing cameras for security reasons was “an appropriate and common sense purpose and not 
one subject to our judicial veto.”19 However, in that same case, Sixth Circuit said that the scope 
of the search – “video recording and image storage of the children while changing their clothes” 
– was excessive because there was nothing in the record to indicate that the school district had 
concerns about safety and security in the school locker rooms to reasonably justify the 
installation of the cameras to record all the activities there. 20 The Sixth Circuit appears to 
analyze the issue of whether the surveillance of students was justified under the “permissible in 
its scope” prong of the reasonableness test before the “justified in its inception” prong of the 
reasonableness. 21  
School employee cases provide additional insight into what makes school video 
surveillance permissible in scope or not.22 Based on a review of school employee cases presented 
in Chapter Two, video surveillance is likely to be permissible in scope when the school video 
surveillance is used over a limited period of time to confirm or deny an individual’s 
                                                
17 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
 
18 516 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2008).  
 
19 Id.  
 
20 Id. In order for such measures to be reasonable in scope, they “must be congruent to the need for such a search in 
order to serve the policy goal of school safety and security.” Id. 
 
21 Id. at 496. 
 
22 Courts determine whether an employee search is permissible in its scope by considering whether “the measures 
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of ... the nature of 
the misconduct.” Dearborn, No. 06-CV-12369-DT, 2008 WL 896066 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2008) (quoting T.L.O., 
469 U.S. at 346). 
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particularized suspicion of wrongdoing.23 Video surveillance is also more likely to be considered 
permissible in its scope when the school is making a visual record of activities without an audio 
recording.24 Finally, courts seem to disagree about how much the method of surveillance itself 
should be factored into the reasonableness of the surveillance. The Brannum court described 
video surveillance as “inherently intrusive . . . [because] a video camera ‘sees all, and forgets 
nothing.’”25 However, the court deciding Brannen v. Kings Local School District Board of 
Education26 explained, “The mere fact that the observation is accompanied by a video camera 
rather than the naked eye, and recorded on film rather than in a supervisor’s memory, does not 
transmogrify a constitutionally innocent act into a constitutional forbidden one.”27  
State Law 
Students and school employees also have challenged school video surveillance under 
state constitutions, state tort law, and state eavesdropping statutes. All but two of these 
challenges were unsuccessful. The outcomes of the state law cases mirrored the Fourth 
Amendment cases because, for the most part, these state cases turned on whether a person had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the place she was recorded. 
The gym teachers in John Doe (1-3) v. Dearborn Public Schools 28 were able to 
demonstrate they had a right of privacy in locker room/office where they changed their clothes.  
Proof of a reasonable expectation of privacy was required to meet their common law tort of 
                                                
23 Chadwell v. Brewer, No. 06-CV-12369-DT, 2008 WL 896066 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2008). 
 
24 Brannen v. Kings Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 761 N.E.2d 84, 92 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). 
 
25 Id.  
 
26 Id. 
 
27 Id.  
 
28 No. 06-CV-12369-DT, 2008 WL 896066 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2008). 
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intrusion claim. On the other hand, the bus driver in State v. Duchow29 lost his state 
eavesdropping statute claim because Wisconsin’s eavesdropping law protects only “oral 
communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not 
subject to interception.” 30 The court explained the bus driver had no reasonable expectation that 
his statements would be kept private because the bus was public property and being operated for 
a public purpose, and the bus “had windows through which [the bus driver] and [the student] 
could be seen.”31 
Plock v. Board of Education of Freeport School District Number 14532 was one of the 
few cases in which a school’s plan to record its teachers was successfully challenged without 
requiring the teachers to prove they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area where 
they would be recorded.33 The teachers argued that Illinois’s eavesdropping law prohibited the 
school from recording them without their consent.34 The Plock court decided that the school’s 
audio recording would violate the state eavesdropping law, noting that the nature of teachers-
student conversations in a classroom is very different from that of a town hall speech that is open 
to the public.35 The court recognized that teachers and students have an interest in not allowing 
their conversations to be recorded because teachers give students life advice in addition to 
                                                
29 749 N.W.2d 913 (Wis. Sup Ct. 2008).  
 
30 Id. at 925.  
31 Id. at 922. 
 
32 920 N.E.2d 1087 (2009). 
 
33 Id. at 1094–95. 
 
34 720 ILCS 5/14—1(d) (West 2006) (requiring the consent of all parties to the conversation in order to record the 
conversation). 
 
35 Plock v. Bd. of Educ. of Freeport Sch. Dist. No. 145, 920 N.E.2d 1087, 1092 (2009). 
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classroom instruction.36  The Plock court also addressed the school district’s argument that its 
recording should be allowed for public policy reasons – safety and security.37 In its response, the 
Plock court said that safety and security were not the only public interests at stake.38 The court 
said protecting privacy was an important interest as well.39 The court further explained that it 
was not persuaded by the school district’s public policy argument because there were other 
means of protecting students that did not involve video or audio surveillance, such as the already 
established teacher and administrative presence in the classroom.40 All courts that are deciding 
school video surveillance issues should consider students’ privacy interests in not being 
recorded. 
What do FERPA, State Laws, and Courts Say about who can Access Public School 
Surveillance Footage and under What Circumstances? 
 
Most of the time, school video surveillance captures students walking to and from their 
destinations, and nobody ever seeks access. However, when school video surveillance captures 
misconduct, such as student theft or fighting, there often are a number of persons interested in 
gaining access to the video. Federal and state privacy laws, along with state public record laws, 
govern the disclosure of school surveillance video.  
FERPA 
 
Parents and students over eighteen years of age can access and decide whom else gets 
access to school surveillance videos when those videos are considered education records under 
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38 Id. 
 
39 Id. 
 
40 Id. 
 
 109 
FERPA.41 There are a few exceptions to this rule, however. The school official-exception allows 
teachers, administrators, and school resource officers to access school education-record 
surveillance videos when those people have a legitimate educational interest in doing so.42 The 
emergency access exception permits school officials to disclose school surveillance videos that 
are education records to appropriate parties, such as police, in emergency situations.43 And 
another exception under FERPA permits schools to disclose students’ education records to the 
entity or persons designated in a lawfully issued subpoena or judicial order.44 
Over the years, the U.S. Department of Education's Family Policy Compliance Office 
(FPCO) has issued conflicting informal guidance on the disclosure of school surveillance videos. 
In 2004, the FPCO said a school surveillance video is an education record for everyone in the 
video and that video could not be released without redactions or without the consent of every 
parent who had a child in the video.45 In 2006, the FPCO issued guidance that said the video is 
an education record for only those students who are the focus of the video.46 This change meant 
that those requesting access no longer needed the consent of parents who had children in the 
                                                
41 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A)(2006). The responsibility for enforcing FERPA lies with the secretary of the 
Department of Education, who may withhold payment or terminate funding to any school or program in violation of 
FERPA, but this has never happened. 
 
42 20 U.S.C. 1232g(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 
43 See 34 CFR §§ 99.31(a)(10) and 99.36. 
 
44 See § 99.31(a)(9)(i) and (ii). 
 
45 Bryner v. Canyons Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 852, 858 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (citing Letter re: Berkeley County Sch. 
Dist., 7 FERPA Answer Book 40, 104 LRP Publications 44490 (Feb. 10, 2004)). 
 
46 See Bryner v. Canyons Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 852, 858 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Opinion of the Texas 
Attorney General, OR 2006-07701 (July 18, 2006) ("[T]he [FPCO] ... has determined that videotapes of this type do 
not constitute the education records of students who did not participate in the altercation.... The [FPCO] has, 
however, determined that the images of the students involved in the altercation do constitute the education records 
of those students. Thus, FERPA does apply to the students involved in the altercation."). 
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background of those videos.47 In its 2006 guidance, the FPCO also recommended that all parents 
with children who are the focus of the video be able to access that video without each other’s 
consent.48 Finally in 2016, according to the National School Boards Association, the FPCO 
reportedly has said that a video can be an education record for a student witness in the 
background of the video, even though that student is not the focus of the video.49 The rule seems 
to have changed again, requiring the parent of the student witness to be consulted in addition to 
those parents who are the focus of the video in order for third parties to access the school 
surveillance video.  
Courts are not in agreement about whether school surveillance videos that are non-
academic can be education records. For example, in 2015 the Utah Court of Appeals said, 
“[N]othing in the plain language of the statute limits the application of FERPA to only academic 
records.”50 And in 2016, a New York trial court concluded a video did not meet FERPA’s 
“directly related to a student” requirement because the video did not relate “in any way to the 
educational performance of the students depicted.”51 While there does not seem to be any sort of 
consensus on whether non-academic videos are education records, this issue seems more settled 
                                                
47 Id. 
 
48 Id. 
 
49 Thomas E. Myers, 2016 FERPA Update: Back to the Basics (Or Back to the Future?), 2016 SCH. L. SEMINAR,  
(National School Boards Association, Fort Worth, TX ), Apr. 7–9, 2016, available at https://cdn-files.nsba.org/s3fs-
public/01-Myers-2016-FERPA-Update-Paper.pdf. 
 
50 Id. 
 
51 Id. 
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in cases that do not involve school surveillance videos; in those cases, non-academic records 
were considered education records.52  
When a school surveillance video is not considered an education record under FERPA, it 
can be released to third parties without parental consent. According to FERPA regulations, an 
education record does not include: (a) records that school officials use as memory aids, (b) 
records created and maintained by a law enforcement unit, (c) records made and maintained by 
school employees in their normal course of business, and (d) records on a student who is 
eighteen years of age or older which are made or maintained by a health care professional who is 
treating the students.53 To date, the FPCO and courts have considered only the issue of whether a 
school surveillance video falls under the law enforcement records exemption.  
FERPA regulations explain that law enforcement records are “those records, files, 
documents, and other materials that are: (1) created by a law enforcement unit, (2) created for a 
law enforcement purpose, and (3) maintained by the law enforcement unit.54 The FPCO has 
issued informal guidance on how FERPA’s law enforcement amendment applies to the 
disclosure of K-12 public school surveillance videos. In 2008, the FPCO said, “Images of 
students captured on security videotapes that are maintained by the school’s law enforcement 
unit are not considered education records under FERPA.”55 The FPCO advised “schools that do 
not have a designated law enforcement unit [to] consider designating an employee to serve as the 
                                                
52 See, e.g., Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002) (holding that tests that students 
exchanged and graded were education records under FERPA); Zaal v. Maryland, 602 A.2d 1247 (Md. 1992) 
(holding school guidance counselors’ notes are education records under FERPA).  
 
53  20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(4)(B) (2006). 
 
54 34 C.F.R. § 99.8. 
 
55 Balancing Student Privacy and School Safety: A Guide to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act for 
Elementary and Secondary Schools, FAMILY POLICY COMPLIANCE OFFICE (Oct. 2007) [Hereinafter Balancing 
Student Privacy], https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/brochures/elsec.pdf.  
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‘law enforcement unit’ in order to maintain the security camera and determine the appropriate 
circumstances in which the school would disclose recorded images.”56 This is one area where 
more guidance from the FPCO is needed because of the changing nature of relationships between 
schools and law enforcement.  
State Law  
Ten states expressly recognize a right to privacy in their constitutions, but courts have yet 
to find that a state constitution prohibits school surveillance videos from being disclosed. 57 In 
the only case litigated on this point, State v. Mart,58 the court held that a school surveillance 
video of students fighting on a bus had to be disclosed despite the school district’s argument that 
students had a protected privacy interest in the videotape under the Louisiana constitution. 
Forty-nine states have student privacy statutes, and some of them offer greater student 
privacy protections than FERPA does.59 For example, in WFTV, Inc. v. School Board of 
                                                
56 Id. 
 
57 Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 3, 2015), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-protections-in-state-
constitutions.aspx (“Constitutions in 10 states—Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Montana, South Carolina and Washington—have explicit provisions relating to a right to privacy.”). 
 
58 State v. Mart, 697 So. 2d 1055 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997). 
 
59 See, e.g., Ala. Educ. Code 16-44B-1; Alaska Admin. Code. tit. 4 § 07.060(a); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-1042(J); 
Ark. Code. Ann. § 6-18-109: Cal. Educ. Code § 49076(a), 49077; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-1-123(1); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 
10-10a; 14 Del. Admin. Code § 294; D.C. Code Ann. § 38-355; Fla. Stat. § 1002.22; Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-660 – 
20-2-668; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 302D-23; Idaho Code Ann. § 33-133; 105 ILCS 10/1-10; Ind. Code § 20-33-7-1; Iowa 
Code § 22.7; Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 72-6215 – 72- 6223; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 160.700 – 160.730; La. Rev. Stat. § 17-
3914; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 20-A, § 951; Md. Code. Ann. Educ. §§ 4-131; Mass Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 34D; Mich. Comp. 
Laws § 388.1601; Minn. Stat. § 13.32; Miss. Code Ann. §§ 37- 15-1; Mo. Rev. Stat. §161.096; Montana Code Ann. 
(2015): 20-1- 213(5); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-2,104; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 392.029; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §189;65; N.J. 
Admin. Code § 6A:32-7.1; N.M. Code R. § 6.29.1.9(E); New York State Education Law § 2-c; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 
115C-402; N.D. Cent. Code § 15.1-07-25.1; Ohio Rev. Code § 149.011; Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 3-168; Or. Rev. Stat. § 
326.565; 22 Pa. Code § 51.72; R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-71- 1; S.C. Code 1976 § 59-1-490; SDCL § 13-3-51; Tenn. 
Code § 49-1- 702; Tex. Gov. Code §552.114; Utah Code Ann. § 53A-1-711; VA ST § 22.1-287; RCW 
28A.600.475; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 126-94-16.1; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-2-202. 
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Seminole,60 the Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal held the state’s student privacy law 
prohibited the disclosure of school bus surveillance video, even if the personally identifying 
information was redacted. The court explained that while FERPA protects “personally 
identifiable information,” the Florida statute protects “personal information,” which is more 
encompassing than FERPA’s personally identifiable information.61    
School Policies 
Students have a right to challenge school video surveillance under a school policy if the 
policy prohibits surveillance.62 However, students must be aware that a school can change its 
policy at any time. One teacher sued her school district for violating its own policy that 
prohibited involuntary videotaping but lost her case because the policy was obsolete.63 The court 
would not allow the teacher to hold the school district to its old policy.64 
What Best Practices should Public Schools follow when they are Considering Adopting or 
Increasing School Video Surveillance Measures?  
 
Research conducted for this thesis suggests that schools are increasingly using video 
surveillance.65 Based on the limited school video surveillance case law, courts have determined 
that schools are within their legal bounds to record their students in common areas, especially if 
the recording does not involve sound. Courts seem to have fully embraced the idea that students 
are members of a special group in society that need to be protected, but only one court has 
                                                
60 WFTV, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole, 874 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 
61 Id. 
 
62 See Roberts v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 788 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. App. 1990), writ denied (June 27, 1990). 
 
63 Id. 
 
64 Id. 
 
65 See, e.g., Lucinda Gray, et al., U.S. Dep't of Educ., Public School Safety and Discipline: 2013–14 (2015), Nat’l 
Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Public School Safety and Discipline: 2013–14 (2015), 
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2015/2015051.pdf. 
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considered the possibility that protection might mean less school video surveillance rather than 
more school video surveillance in common areas like classrooms.  
As discussed in Chapter One of this thesis, a school’s decision to subject a student to 
school video surveillance may chill her creativity and growth may alter her self-image, and may 
create records that could follow her long after her schooling has ended.66 The importance of 
protecting student privacy becomes clear when a world without it is considered. Imagine a 
student trying to move forward after making a poor decision that was recorded on school 
surveillance cameras. Even if future employers do not hold it against her, she may hold it against 
herself, limiting her own possibilities for growth and change. As Bryan Warnick, an Ohio State 
University professor, noted in his research on school video surveillance: “Places of human 
growth and development [like schools] need to be places that possess a certain type of 
forgiveness . . . . The presence of video cameras and recordings sends a message of neither 
forgiveness nor forgetfulness.”67  
School districts have the authority and opportunity to create policies that offer student 
privacy protections beyond what state and federal laws provide. Yet, past studies have shown 
that most districts across the nation choose not to do so.68 School districts should create policies 
                                                
66 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 UNIV. OF PENN. L. REV. 477, 493 (2006); Julie E. Cohen, 
Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1397–98 (2000); danah 
boyd, Making Sense of Privacy and Publicity, SXSW (Austin, TX, Mar.13, 2010), 
http://www.danah.org/papers/talks/2010/ SXSW2010.html. 
 
67 Warnick, supra note 20, at 319. 
 
68 See, e.g., CROCKFORD, K. & ROSSMAN, J., BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD: STUDENT PRIVACY IN 
MASSACHUSETTS K-12 SCHOOLS, ACLU Foundation of Massachusetts (2015), available at 
https://aclum.org/app/uploads/2015/10/back_to_the_drawing_board_report_large_file_size.pdf; JOEL REIDENBERG 
ET AL., FORDHAM CTR. L. & INFO. POL’Y, PRIVACY AND CLOUD COMPUTING IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2013) [hereinafter 
FORDHAM CLIP STUDY], available at http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article=1001&context=clip 
(finding “fewer than 7% of school districts have safeguards in place that restrict the sale of student information by 
vendors;” “[f]ewer than 20% of school districts have proper policies in place for the usage of cloud services;” and 
“[a]t least 25% of school contracts for classroom functions involved no financial payment”).   
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that balance student privacy needs in addition to school security needs. These best practices 
would meet both needs. 
Schools Should Think Harder about the Justification for School Video Surveillance 
Before adopting video surveillance, schools should clearly articulate the purpose of the 
surveillance. Then, surveillance measures should be limited to what is necessary to achieve that 
purpose. The principal purpose of school video surveillance should be to keep schools safe, not 
to catch students in the act of misbehaving so that they can be suspended, expelled, or 
prosecuted. 
While it is probably legal for schools to silently record students in classrooms, 
gymnasiums, cafeterias, parking lots, hallways, and stairwells, it is unlikely that video 
surveillance measures are necessary in all of those locations. Schools should avoid recording 
students in areas like classrooms, cafeterias, and gymnasiums for two reasons: (1) these are areas 
in which schools should encourage creativity and self discovery and (2) teachers and 
administrators are likely to be present in these areas, which means that school safety issues could 
be addressed without the use of school video surveillance. On the other hand, under the Fourth 
Amendment, school video surveillance of parking lots, hallways, and stairwells may be justified 
because these areas are more likely to be unmonitored by teachers and administrators due to a 
lack of school resources. Therefore, video surveillance in those areas would make sense as a 
security measure. To avoid legal liability, schools should not install surveillance cameras in an 
area where there is a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Courts have established that students 
and teachers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in school locker rooms and bathrooms, or 
anywhere else someone could be undressing.69 Furthermore, school-employee school video 
                                                
69 Brannum v. Overton Cnty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 499 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that surreptitious video 
surveillance of a student locker room violates the Fourth Amendment). 
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surveillance cases suggest that students may also have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a 
school office, if that student is discussing her grades, family issues, or other confidential 
information.  
Consider the Scope of the Video Surveillance 
 
One court determined that recording teachers is reasonable if the recording was limited in 
time and focused squarely on the area of concern (i.e. the camera was positioned exactly in the 
part of a school office where a theft was expected). However, in one school bus surveillance 
case, the court showed that there are circumstances where recording more rather than less (i.e. 
focusing the recording on only one person) can be less invasive. While choosing the scope of 
surveillance is dependent on why the video surveillance is needed in the first place, data 
minimization is one of the most important Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) – a set of 
principles that are the backbone of privacy law.70 This best practice guide recommends limiting 
the scope of surveillance to what is necessary not only as a means of limiting a school’s liability 
but also as a security measure. According to the Federal Trade Commission, storing a large 
amount of data may make a business or entity “a more enticing target for data thieves or 
hackers.”71     
Notify Students, Parents, and School employees.  
 
Notices should be placed around the school, in the school’s handbook, and on the 
school’s website to inform all persons what areas in the school will be subjected to video 
surveillance. This will help schools avoid liability because it will be harder for students to claim 
                                                
70 Maureen K. Ohlhausen, The Power of Data, Federal Trade Commission (2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/299801/140422georgetownbigdataprivacy.pdf.  
 
71 FTC Report on Internet of Things Urges Companies to Adopt Best Practices to Address Consumer Privacy and 
Security Risks, Federal Trade Commission (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/01/ftc-
report-internet-things-urges-companies-adopt-best-practices.  
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they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in an area if a sign is clearly posted notifying the 
student that she is being recorded. Notice also will help schools deter misconduct.  
Schools Should Carefully Consider Whether Video Surveillance will be Maintained by Schools 
Officials or a Law Enforcement Unit 
 
Under FERPA, schools maintain “education records” and law enforcement units maintain 
“law enforcement records.” When law enforcement units maintain school surveillance videos, 
they can be released to the public without parental consent or the consent of students who are 
over eighteen. When schools maintain school surveillance videos they are considered education 
records under FERPA, which cannot be released without parental consent or the consent of a 
student who is eighteen or older unless an exception applies. Having the school maintain the 
videos may provide greater protection to student privacy, but it comes at a cost. Transparency 
will be sacrificed. For example, parental access may be limited depending on which FPCO 
guidance, if any, a school district decides to follow in determining whether school video 
surveillance footage can be disclosed.72 Additionally, news organizations argue that they are able 
to do a better job as a government watchdog when they have access to such information.73 On the 
other hand, students who have already paid for the consequences of their actions may end up 
paying for those consequences again and again if the surveillance footage of their misbehavior is 
aired on the news.  
                                                
72 School districts and courts have handled the release of education-record school surveillance videos to parent in 
very different ways. See Bryner v. Canyons Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 852, 857 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (holding that the 
video surveillance tape was an education record under FERPA that could not be released to the parent of a student 
involved in an altercation unless that parent paid the cost of having the video redacted; Jacobson v. Ithaca City Sch. 
Dist., 53 Misc. 3d. 1091, 1093 (N.Y. Supp. Ct. 2016) (holding the parent of a student involved in an altercation 
could obtain copies of the video surveillance was not an education record under FERPA); Rome City Sch. Dist. v. 
Grifasi, 806 N.Y.S.2d 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (a student was able to obtain access to a surveillance video of an 
altercation that he was involved in because court found it was s law enforcement, which can be disclosed to the 
public without parental consent or consent of a student who is eighteen or older). 
 
73 See FERPA and Access to Public Records, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. 1 (2016), 
http://du1hnuqovpr1r.cloudfront.net/2016041371l3MOalqW/dist/img/ferpa_wp.pdf. 
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If schools decide to maintain school surveillance videos, those who are designated to help 
or protect students still will be able to obtain access under one of FERPA’s exceptions. For 
example, FERPA’s health or emergency exception and FERPA’s court order exception provide 
police with opportunities to access school surveillance video both in emergency situations and to 
conduct investigations as long as they have probable cause. Therefore, this best practice guides 
recommends that school officials, rather than law enforcement units, maintain school 
surveillance videos. 
Establish Good Security Measures 
 
Video surveillance data should be protected through suitable security measures. All video 
recordings must be stored in a secure place to prevent unauthorized access and to ensure 
confidentiality. In school surveillance cases, courts have noted when schools’ security measures 
were inadequate. For example, in Brannum v. Overton County School Board, 74 a case involving 
a school’s video surveillance of students in a school locker room, the court expressed its concern 
about the fact that “[n]either [the assistant principal] nor anyone else had ever changed the 
system password or username from its default setting.”75 In John Doe (1-3) v. Dearborn Public 
School,76 a case involving the video surveillance of school employees in a school locker room, 
the court noted that images from the concealed camera were displayed on a monitor located in 
the main office copy room, making it possible for passersby to view the footage easily.77 While 
these details were mentioned in the fact sections rather than the discussion sections of the courts’ 
opinions, the courts clearly frowned these practices.   
                                                
74 516 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2008).  
 
75 Id. at 492. 
 
76 No. 06-CV-12369-DT, 2008 WL 896066 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2008). 
 
77 No. 06-CV-12369-DT, 2008 WL 896066, *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2008). 
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Suggestions for Further Research 
Future studies are needed to examine the extent to which courts do and should consider a 
school’s surveillance measures when determining whether a student’s privacy rights have been 
violated. This case review has provided a close look at how courts arrived at conclusions about 
whether school video surveillance videos violate students’ privacy rights. Only a few courts have 
discussed video surveillance as a search method and, as discussed above, those courts seem to 
disagree about how much the method of surveillance itself should be factored into the 
reasonableness of the surveillance. One court said that school video surveillance in general is 
“inherently intrusive . . . [because] a video camera ‘sees all, and forgets nothing.”78 Another 
court explained, “The mere fact that the observation is accompanied by a video camera rather 
than the naked eye, and recorded on film rather than in a supervisor’s memory, does not 
transmogrify a constitutionally innocent act into a constitutional forbidden one.”79 Fourth 
Amendment cases outside the public school context may provide more insight about how courts 
perceive video surveillance and other emerging technologies. This research could suggest how 
courts will rule in school surveillance cases involving emerging technologies.80 
Future studies also are needed to examine school district policies to learn how schools are 
handling school video surveillance. In particular, researchers could learn which areas on a 
school’s campus are under school video surveillance and to whom those videos are being 
                                                
78 Brannum v. Overton Cty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 495 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 
79 Brannen v. Kings Local Sch. Dist., 761 N.E.2d 84 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). 
 
80 This includes facial recognition, Global Positioning System (GPS) monitoring, and Radio-frequency identification 
(RFID), which uses electromagnetic fields to automatically identify and track tags attached students’ ID cards, and 
biometric monitoring.  
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disclosed. Given school districts’ great authority to create, implement, and enforce educational 
policy, there is a great deal of insight to be gained from such research. 
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